Suchergebnisse

Throughout the OECD, governments have been contracting out an increasing range of goods and services. Against this background, this article outlines the case for, and assesses the merits of, placing the purchase of governmental policy advice on a more competitive basis. Two options are given particular attention: first, the creation of an internal market for policy advice within the public sector under which departments and other government agencies would tender to supply specific policy outputs; and second, a more radical option under which public and private sector organizations would compete for the contracts to supply governmental policy advice. Drawing on the insights of the new institutional economics, it is argued that neither option is likely to enhance the efficiency or effectiveness with which policy advice is produced, whether under conditions of short‐term or long‐term contracting. This is due to the likelihood of: only partial contestability (due, among other things, to asset specificity in the form of transaction‐specific expertise and trust); a greater risk of opportunistic behavior by the suppliers of advice (and also, under some conditions, by the purchasers); higher agency costs and transaction costs; and greater problems with respect to horizontal and vertical policy coordination. Such considerations suggest that the widespread reliance of governments on relatively permanent advisory institutions and in‐house expertise can be explained and justified on the same theoretical grounds that have prompted the contracting out of other publicly‐funded goods and services.

Assesses the merits of placing the purchase of governmental policy advice on a more competitive basis; OECD countries, chiefly.

This article explores the nature and impact of New Zealand's financial management reforms introduced by the fourth Labour Government (1984-90). These reforms, which were given legislative backing via the Public Finance Act 1989, are of interest not merely because of their scope and scale, but because of some of the concepts and principles which have fashioned their design and implementation. In particular, the article highlights the importance which has been attached to the distinction between departmental outputs and outcomes, and the distinction between the interest that a government has as a purchaser of department goods and services and its interest as an owner of departmental assets, and explains how these distinctions have been used to fashion the new framework of accountability. In evaluating the reform programme, the article draws on the results of a comprehensive review undertaken on behalf of the National Government (1990- ) and published in late 1991. This reveals overwhelming support for the new policy framework amongst senior officials and ministers. It also indicates that the reforms are beginning to achieve their intended goals of improving departmental efficiency and accountability and facilitating better expenditure control. Finally, some of the issues which the new financial management regime has either generated or failed to resolve are explored.

This article examines the new approach to specifying and assessing the performance of departmental chief executives in New Zealand introduced in 1988 by the fourth Labour government (1984–1990). Drawing on the findings of a series of interviews with ministers, chief executives and other senior public servants conducted between late 1989 and late 1991 by a number of researchers, the article outlines the origins and implementation of the new policy framework, and evaluates its strengths and weaknesses. From the evidence available to date, it appears that the new model has won the support of most of the parties directly affected, and that it has enhanced the accountability of chief executives to their portfolio minister(s). However, the implementation of the new regime has highlighted the inherent problems of assessing the performance of senior personnel in the public sector and of imposing sanctions in the event of substandard performance. In addition, various issues of a constitutional nature have arisen concerning the roles and responsibilities of chief executives, the balance of power between chief executives and their portfolio minister(s), and the proper role of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the new accountability framework.

Attempts to improve horizontal coordination between Cabinet ministers and central agencies since 1984.

The problems of coordinating the development and implementation of public policy are legion. While such problems are most commonly associated with large federal systems, they can arise with equal force and complexity in small, highly centralized, unitary states such as New Zealand. This article has four main purposes. First, it briefly surveys some of the recent literature on the nature of coordination and the mechanisms for enhancing policy coordination in government. Second, it outlines the nature and causes of the coordination difficulties that have been encountered in recent years in New Zealand. Third, it explores the various attempts which the Labour government (1984–90) and the National government (1990–present) have made to overcome these difficulties. Finally, the article considers some of the lessons which emerge from New Zealand's recent experience.