How China Can Strengthen International Nuclear Security
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 11-17
ISSN: 1468-2699
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In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 11-17
ISSN: 1468-2699
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 11-17
ISSN: 0039-6338
World Affairs Online
In: Contemporary security policy, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 559-581
ISSN: 1352-3260, 0144-0381
In: Issues in international security series
World Affairs Online
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 315-322
ISSN: 1743-9019
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 27-56
ISSN: 1938-3282
This country report is the first study of uranium governance in the United Kingdom. It explores the UK's approach to regulating natural uranium and provides a historical overview of uranium procurement and usage. The report documents British and Euratom nuclear legislation, regulation and implementation, including export/import and transportation regulations. This case study is part of the large 'Governing Uranium' project on uranium governance, led by DIIS, the Danish Institute for International Studies. The project identifies governance gaps in uranium accountability and control and provide policy recommendations for improving front-end transparency, security, and regulation.
BASE
In: Contemporary security policy, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 303
ISSN: 1352-3260, 0144-0381
In: Whitehall paper 76
Introduction -- The G8, non-proliferation and the global partnership -- Funding, prioritisation, results and evaluation -- Operational delivery and spin-off benefits -- The future of multilateral threat reduction -- Annex A: Global partnership documents, Kananaskis G8 Summit, 27 June 2002 -- Annex B: Research interviews -- Annex C: Case studies -- Annex D: EU instrument for stability -- Annex E: US threat reduction programmes -- Annex F: Non-G8 GP country commitments and expenditure.
In: Whitehall paper, 76
The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a new urgency in efforts to deal with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferation. The potential acquisition and use by terrorist groups of such weaponry was suddenly a much increased threat. The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction subsequently encouraged some twenty-two countries and the European Union to pledge up to $20 billion to address this challenge. The creation of the Global Partnership was the first time so many countries agreed to collaborate on a range of non-proliferation, security and nuclear safety programmes, as well as commit such an amount of resources to them. Based on extensive primary research, this Whitehall Paper assesses the success and shortcomings to date of the Global Partnership, and suggests how the mechanism can be bolstered and taken forward.
In: Arms Control, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 304-322