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Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union's Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups' activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups' activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups' activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups' activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups' activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups' activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.

Parmi les rares conclusions rigoureuses de la littérature consacrée aux politiques publiques, on trouve le fait que la dynamique politique est à la fois une fonction de stabilité et de volatilité. Et bien que la plupart des théories relatives à la politique publique postulent que la survenue de moments critiques politiques constitue une condition nécessaire à un changement d'envergure, les études qui cherchent à démêler l'écheveau des mécanismes sous-jacents de ces moments critiques demeurent relativement rares. Le présent article développe l'hypothèse selon laquelle ces moments critiques, généralement considérés comme des vecteurs de changements d'envergure, impliquent pour l'essentiel une causalité commune. Nous montrons que les forces du changement ont une nature commune et qui les renforce mutuellement à l'aide d'une étude de cas axée sur la réglementation relative aux primes. Le présent article, qui se base sur une analyse documentaire et une analyse de programme politique, démontre que la plupart des changements de la règlementation relative aux primes étaient marginaux. Nous soutenons que la nature intrinsèquement attrayante de la récompense des performances, combinée à une totale absence d'alternatives soutenues par une coalition forte et visant à modérer l'appétit du risque sur les marchés financiers, semble jouer un rôle dans la résilience des pratiques en matière de primes. En théorie, l'étude de cas contribue au développement de la théorie de la causalité commune qui entraîne des changements politiques majeurs. Sur le mode empirique, elle expose un mécanisme clé utilisé par le secteur financier pour résister aux réformes : proposer une alternative que personne ne peut refuser. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens La littérature relative à la politique exprime un vaste consensus quant au fait que les changements politiques résultent généralement de forces multiples. Nous identifions cette causalité commune des changements politiques et suggérons que parmi les forces du changement, une alternative politique forte capable d'unir une vaste coalition de parties prenantes constitue une condition nécessaire à un changement politique. Il est donc peu probable que les réformes financières, et plus spécifiquement la pratique des primes, soient moins le résultat d'une réglementation stricte que d'alternatives réelles pour récompenser l'excellence professionnelle et réduire l'appétit du risque.

One of the few robust findings in the public policy literature is that policy dynamics are both a function of stability and volatility. And although most theories of public policy making posit the occurrence of policy junctures as necessary conditions for significant change, studies that set out to unravel the underlying mechanisms of such policy junctures remain relatively rare. This article further develops the idea of policy junctures, commonly hypothesized to initiate significant change, as essentially entailing joint causation. We illustrate the joint and reinforcing nature of forces of change with a case study of bonus regulation. Based on document analysis and a political claim analysis, this article shows that most changes in bonus regulation were of a marginal nature. We argue that the intrinsically attractive nature of performance rewards that a bonus practice entails combined with a sheer lack of alternatives supported by a strong coalition on how to curb risk appetite in financial markets seem to count for the resilience of bonus practices. Theoretically, the case study contributes to theory development on joint causation that causes major policy change. Empirically, it unravels a key mechanism employed by the financial sector to resist reforms: offering an alternative no one can refuse. Points for practitioners There is a broad consensus in the policy literature that policy change usually results from multiple forces. We identify this crucial jointly causal nature of policy change and suggest that among the forces of change a strong policy alternative capable of uniting a broad coalition of stakeholders is a necessary condition for policy change. Financial reforms, in particular the practice of bonus payment, are thus not likely to result from tight regulation, but rather from real alternatives on how to reward professional excellence and curb risk appetite.

The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the 'supply' of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce 'demand' for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions.