Suchergebnisse

This paper aims to assess the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the recent reforms of the EU's economic governance. It shows that, despite the post-Lisbon communitarisation of the EMU policy-making, the impact of the EP was limited. Based on original interview data and a wealth of primary and secondary sources, it reveals that the EP was only able to produce limited 'first-order changes' (i.e., adjustments to the details of the policy regime), whereas it had almost no influence on the goals and instruments of the EMU. The paper argues that the limited influence of the EP can be explained by the dominant role member states (still) play in the EMU. They defined the 'policy core' of economic and budgetary policies (in terms of sound public finances and low inflation) before the upgrade of the EP's powers with the Lisbon treaty, and using several strategies they defended it successfully in the post-Lisbon context. The paper reviews the key policies adopted by the EU to tackle the crisis – from the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact to legislation on the Banking Union – and identifies five strategies through which the Council (often in tandem with the Commission) successfully managed to curb the influence of the EP.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration on 19 July 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/07036337.2016.1178251. ; This article analyses the role of the European Council in two key legislative packages on economic and budgetary coordination, the Six-pack and the Two-pack, which were negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure. It assesses how and to what extent the key actor in the literature on the new intergovernmentalism – the European Council – is able to curb the powers of the supranational institutions – the Commission and the European Parliament – in a policy area where the community method has been applied since the Treaty of Lisbon. It tracks the development of the legislative negotiations – from the stages preceding the Commission's proposal to their conclusions, relying on official documents, press reports and 30 original interviews with key decision-makers. The strong role of the European Council both as an agenda-setter and in the legislative negotiations stands out, and suggests that the implications of new intergovernmentalism may well extend beyond intergovernmental decision-making processes.

This article analyses the role of the European Council in two key legislative packages on economic and budgetary coordination, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure. It assesses how, and to what extent, the key actor in the literature on the new intergovernmentalism – the European Council – is able to curb the powers of the supranational institutions – the Commission and the European Parliament – in a policy area where the community method has been applied since the Treaty of Lisbon. It tracks the development of the legislative negotiations from the stages preceding the Commission's proposal to their conclusions relying on official documents, press reports and thirty-four original interviews with key decision-makers. The strong role of the European Council both as an agenda-setter and in the legislative negotiations stands out, and suggests that the implications of new intergovernmentalism may well extend beyond intergovernmental decision-making processes.

The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted a change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP How could this U-turn be explained Relying on several different data - the EUANDI party data set, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP - this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explains the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second-order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first-order' national strategic objectives.

The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted a change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data – the EUANDI party data set, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP – this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explains the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second-order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first-order' national strategic objectives.

The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic EFDD Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data – the EUANDI party dataset, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP – this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case-study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explain the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first order' national strategic objectives.