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Attempting to buy votes is, in some cases, inefficient and damaging to a clientelistic party. To explain why, we propose the concept of electoral retaliation: sanctioning clientelistic parties by voting against them or intentionally invalidating the ballot. These forms of negative reciprocity are meant to uphold the democratic norms—equal participation, popular sovereignty, electoral fairness—that vote buying undermines. Electoral retaliation is, we theorize, the domain of "democrats." Thus, we expect voters who highly value democratic norms to be most likely to retaliate against vote-buying parties. We test our theory's observable implications with a research design that pairs case study and subnational evidence from Argentina with cross-national evidence from Latin America. Results are consistent with the notion that when clientelistic parties target democrats, it is likely to backfire on the machine. Our analyses examine multiple indicators of democratic support, explore causal mechanisms, conduct placebo tests, and seek to rule out various forms of selection bias.

[EN] Presidential approval tends to exhibit the dynamics of honeymoon, decline, and a rebound as elections near. But several presidential administrations and, indeed, some countries themselves, do not conform to this pattern. This introduction to the special issue identifies and classifies outliers to the typical dynamics of approval using a 12-category taxonomy and data on 140 presidential administrations in 18 Latin American countries from the Executive Approval Project 1.0. Contributors to this special issue use this taxonomy to select outlier cases to explain in their respective articles. This combination of cross-national and case-study approaches suggest a more general theory of presidential approval can be constructed by systematically testing new hypotheses generated in this special issue concerning the role of governing style, political communication, security, policy choice, and institutional context.

How does democratic politics inform the interdisciplinary debate on the evolution of human co-operation and the social preferences (for example, trust, altruism and reciprocity) that support it? This article advances a theory of partisan trust discrimination in electoral democracies based on social identity, cognitive heuristics and interparty competition. Evidence from behavioral experiments in eight democracies show 'trust gaps' between co- and rival partisans are ubiquitous, and larger than trust gaps based on the social identities that undergird the party system. A natural experiment found that partisan trust gaps in the United States disappeared immediately following the killing of Osama bin Laden. But observational data indicate that partisan trust gaps track with perceptions of party polarization in all eight cases. Finally, the effects of partisanship on trust outstrip minimal group treatments, yet minimal-group effects are on par with the effects of most treatments for ascriptive characteristics in the literature. In sum, these findings suggest political competition dramatically shapes the salience of partisanship in interpersonal trust, the foundation of co-operation.

Institutional and behavioral theories of democracy abound but rarely intersect. Do executive lawmaking power and prowess condition democratic regime support in presidential democracies? We develop theoretical expectations linking the lawmaking powers of the president and mass regime support and test them by analyzing survey data from eighteen Latin American countries over ten years. As hypothesized, results indicate that preference for, and satisfaction with, democracy is highest where presidents have moderate legislative powers and success and lowest where presidents either dominate policymaking or face gridlock. Hence, a "happy medium" of presidential power promotes the attitudinal foundations of democracy.

Trust and reciprocity are theoretically essential to strong democracies and efficient markets. Working from the theoretical frameworks of social identity and cognitive heuristics, this study draws on dual-process models of decision making to expect (1) the trustor to infer trustworthiness from partisan stereotypes and thus to discriminate trust in favor of co-partisans and against rival partisans, but (2) the trustee to base reciprocity decisions on real information about the trustor's deservingness rather than a partisan stereotype. So whereas partisanship is likely to trigger trust biases, the trust decision itself provides enough information to override partisan biases in reciprocity. The analysis derives from a modified trust game experiment. Overall, the results suggest partisanship biases trust decisions among partisans, and the degree of partisan trust bias is consistent with expectations from both social identity theory and cognitive heuristics. When it comes to reciprocity, however, information about the other subject's level of trust nullifies partisan bias. Adapted from the source document.