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Political scientists frequently use instrumental variables (IV) estimation to estimate the causal effect of an endogenous treatment variable. However, when the treatment effect is heterogeneous, this estimation strategy only recovers the local average treatment effect (LATE). The LATE is an average treatment effect (ATE) for a subset of the population: units that receive treatment if and only if they are induced by an exogenous IV. However, researchers may instead be interested in the ATE for the entire population of interest. In this article, we develop a simple reweighting method for estimating the ATE, shedding light on the identification challenge posed in moving from the LATE to the ATE. We apply our method to two published experiments in political science in which we demonstrate that the LATE has the potential to substantively differ from the ATE.

AbstractUnderstanding the determinants of support for democracy remains at the heart of many puzzles in international and comparative political economy. A central but still unresolved topic in this literature is the conditions under which such support dissipates. To answer this question, this article focuses on distributional politics: since democratic leaders possess limited budgets but need to win elections, they often skew resources toward one politically influential sector, leading to more negative attitudes toward democracy among electorally ignored populations. In particular, we argue that governments often face a key political trade-off: whether to direct resources to the agricultural sector or to encourage urban development. After developing this argument in a formal model, we detail historical accounts that substantiate the mechanisms identified in the model. Finally, we provide cross-national quantitative evidence that discontent with democracy increases among geographic populations when governments disproportionately distribute resources toward other sectors.

How do crises affect trade policy? This article reconciles starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. It first formally develops the mechanisms by which two features of shocks –intensityandduration– influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. The central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate 'knock-on' effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. The study incorporates these countervailing pressures in its analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when affected firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. The theoretical predictions are tested using sub-national and cross-national data, and real-world illustrations are presented to highlight the mechanisms driving the results.

How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions against democratic targets than our theories assume, and that even citizens who value transparency the most still wrestle with a trade-off between their normative commitments and the instrumental benefits they perceive covert actions to hold. Our results thus help to explain why American leaders have repeatedly chosen to conduct covert military operations against fellow democracies, and raise important questions about the scope conditions of normative theories of the democratic peace.

How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions against democratic targets than our theories assume, and that even citizens who value transparency the most still wrestle with a trade-off between their normative commitments and the instrumental benefits they perceive covert actions to hold. Our results thus help to explain why American leaders have repeatedly chosen to conduct covert military operations against fellow democracies, and raise important questions about the scope conditions of normative theories of the democratic peace.

AbstractExisting research generally finds that foreign aid is ineffective in bolstering perceptions of governance, especially in conflict‐affected countries. Yet while most studies have focused on aid provided to state actors, this paper examines the link between aid and popular support for governing institutions in rebel‐held territory. We argue that aid can improve opinions of these institutions when they are embedded in the demographic, aspirational, and experiential solidarities of their communities. To evaluate our theory, we analyze new perceptions of data collected from residents of 27 rebel‐held communities inside Syria from 2014 to 2016. We find a modest but positive effect of aid on perceptions of local institutions, but only when the institutions were not imposed by outside actors. These results are further supported by a case study of Raqqa City, which shows that aid only boosted citizens' views of the local governing body when it was embedded within the community.