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This study analyzes opinions published by federal district judges in women's rights and racial minority discrimination cases in the period 1971-1977. Our analysis revealed that the petitioner in women's rights cases was only slightly more likely to be victorious than litigants from other disadvantaged groups. Using a regional variable, we found no significant differences between northern and southern judges deciding women's rights cases. However, the judge's political party identification proved to be an important variable, and a meaningful split was found to exist between Democratic and Republican jurists in women's rights decisions.

The Supreme Court and judicial scholars have argued that the demographic composition of grand and petit juries is important. To the extent that composition is a function of the selection system used, this suggests that the method of selecting grand and petit jurors is important. This article tests the link between selection system and composition by comparing the representation of blacks, Mexican‐Americans, and women on grand juries selected by commissioners with the same three classes' representation on grand juries selected at random from the voter registration lists. For these jurisdictions, only female representation is consistently higher under random selection procedures.

"Known for shedding light on the link between the courts, public policy, and the political environment, the 12th edition of Judicial Process in America will provide a comprehensive overview of the American judiciary. Considering the courts from every level, the authors thoroughly cover judges, lawyers, litigants, and the variables at play in judicial decision making"--

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.