Information, Commitment, and War
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 4, S. 556-580
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
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In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 4, S. 556-580
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: American political science review, Band 102, Heft 4, S. 435-452
ISSN: 1537-5943
The actual impact of judicial decisions often depends on the behavior of executive and legislative bodies that implement the rulings. Consequently, when a court hears a case involving the interests of those controlling the executive and legislative institutions, those interests can threaten to obstruct the court's intended outcome. In this paper, we evaluate whether and to what extent such constraints shape judicial rulings. Specifically, we examine how threats of noncompliance and legislative override influence decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Based on a statistical analysis of a novel dataset of ECJ rulings, we find that the preferences of member-state governments—whose interests are central to threats of noncompliance and override—have a systematic and substantively important impact on ECJ decisions.
In: American political science review, Band 102, Heft 4, S. 435-452
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 502-504
ISSN: 1476-4989
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 465-482
ISSN: 1476-4989
Beginning in 1999, Curtis Signorino challenged the use of traditional logits and probits analysis for testing discrete-choice, strategic models. Signorino argues that the complex parametric relationships generated by even the simplest strategic models can lead to wildly inaccurate inferences if one applies these traditional approaches. In their stead, Signorino proposes generating stochastic formal models, from which one can directly derive a maximum likelihood estimator. We propose a simpler, alternative methodology for theoretically and empirically accounting for strategic behavior. In particular, we propose carefully and correctly deriving one's comparative statics from one's formal model, whether it is stochastic or deterministic does not particularly matter, and using standard logit or probit estimation techniques to test the predictions. We demonstrate that this approach performs almost identically to Signorino's more complex suggestion.
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 502
ISSN: 1047-1987
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 465-482
ISSN: 1047-1987
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 30, Heft 12, S. 2643-2664
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 431-460
ISSN: 1460-3667
In a principal–agent relationship, how should principals budget time for oversight when oversight activity is not instantaneous? We develop a formal model of resource allocation by a principal monitoring multiple agents, where the principal faces a dynamic budgeting problem. Our model reveals a tension between the value of holding resources in reserve to maintain the threat of an audit and the direct policy gains of monitoring activity. We show that as the frequency of principal–agent conflict increases, there are some conditions under which the most effective strategy for a principal is to allocate less and less of their total time to monitoring. The model has important implications for the empirical analysis of a monitoring setting where a principal oversees multiple agents.
In: American political science review, Band 102, Heft 4, S. 435-452
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 1125-1137
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 1125-1138
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 1125-1137
ISSN: 1468-2508
Courts often interpret and attempt to enforce rules designed to economically integrate federal and international organizations. In this article, we investigate to what degree court rulings can liberalize trade by examining data from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Studying the ECJ allows us to compare the Court's effectiveness through two different mechanisms: infringement proceedings, which are purely a form of international adjudication, and preliminary references, which are applied through national courts. We find infringement rulings have no effect on a nation's intra-EU imports, while preliminary rulings have a positive, though temporary, effect on a nation's intra-EU imports. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 691-704
ISSN: 1469-2112
Scholars often use roll-call votes to study legislative behaviour. However, many legislatures only conclude a minority of decisions by roll call. Thus, if these votes are not a random sample of the universe of votes cast, scholars may be drawing misleading inferences. In fact, theories over why roll-call votes are requested would predict selection bias based on exactly the characteristics of legislative voting that scholars have most heavily studied. This article demonstrates the character and severity of this sampling problem empirically by examining European Parliament vote data for a whole year. Given that many legislatures decided only a fraction of their legislation by roll call, these findings have potentially important implications for the general study of legislative behaviour.
In: British journal of political science, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 691-704
ISSN: 0007-1234