Suchergebnisse

A contentious issue regarding the institutional phenomenon of agencification of the Union administration is the question whether and to which extent executive powers may be conferred on EU agencies. This question has arisen because the Treaties neither foresee nor exclude the possibility for the Union legislature to establish other bodies through secondary law. So far this question has also remained unresolved because the Court of Justice has not yet ruled on this specific issue. In the case law of the Court there are however rulings to be found, notably the Meroni and Romano cases, in which the conferral of powers on bodies more or less similar to EU agencies was reviewed. Unsurprisingly these rulings, and especially the Meroni ruling, have therefore attracted the attention of legal scholars in their attempts to frame the process of agencification in the EU. Although the Meroni ruling is much more cited and analysed in the legal debate on agencies than the Romano judgment, it is argued in this contribution that the latter is far more relevant for current day agencies. By applying the reasoning in Romano to the EU agencies it is revealed, even more so than by applying the Meroni doctrine, that the ongoing agencification rests on very shaky legal grounds.

Two decades ago the process of agencification of the EU administration was initiated and has gained momentum ever since. Today there are about 30 agencies scattered across the EU, active in different policy fields and entrusted with different tasks. In a first part this article looks at the history and rationale of agency creation and at the political framework in which EU agencies operate. In a second part, building on the definition and classification of agencies by Griller and Orator, a closer look will be taken at the institutional position of the EU agencies. Because the creation of agencies was neither excluded nor foreseen in the Founding Treaties most authors search for clarification in the 1958 Meroni ruling of the CJEU This article challenges this line of reasoning by identifying a number of problems. Furthermore this article also challenges the way in which a number of authors deduct the principle of institutional balance from the Meroni ruling, applying it to the functioning of agencies, thereby misconstruing the original concern which the Court sought to express through this principle. In the last part the article links this legal discussion to the political discussions on the future framework for the agencies, identifying a critical role for the Commission in supporting the above mentioned dominant legal reasoning.

International audience ; This chapter examines the nature of the Boards of Appeal (BoAs) of EU financial agencies and the type of review they offer. It describes the different operation of the Joint Board of Appeal (JBoA) of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and of the Appeal Panel (AP) of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The chapter analyses their decisions, which are binding and which follow appeal procedures that need to be exhausted before a procedure may be started before the EU Courts. It provides a comparative analysis of the JBoA and the AP, and assesses their suitability in providing effective and swift remedy to individuals.

International audience ; This chapter examines the nature of the Boards of Appeal (BoAs) of EU financial agencies and the type of review they offer. It describes the different operation of the Joint Board of Appeal (JBoA) of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and of the Appeal Panel (AP) of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The chapter analyses their decisions, which are binding and which follow appeal procedures that need to be exhausted before a procedure may be started before the EU Courts. It provides a comparative analysis of the JBoA and the AP, and assesses their suitability in providing effective and swift remedy to individuals.

International audience ; This chapter examines the nature of the Boards of Appeal (BoAs) of EU financial agencies and the type of review they offer. It describes the different operation of the Joint Board of Appeal (JBoA) of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and of the Appeal Panel (AP) of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The chapter analyses their decisions, which are binding and which follow appeal procedures that need to be exhausted before a procedure may be started before the EU Courts. It provides a comparative analysis of the JBoA and the AP, and assesses their suitability in providing effective and swift remedy to individuals.

The German Constitutional Court's ruling on the ECB's PSPP put Europe in a turmoil. By declaring a ruling of the European Court of Justice ultra vires, and therefore not legally binding on Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht openly called into question the primacy of EU law and the authority of the ECJ. In this policy paper we argue that on these grounds there is good reason for the European Commission to bring infringement proceedings against Germany in order to, amongst others, protect the European legal order and emphasize the notion of equality of States in the EU.