Suchergebnisse

Background China never stops taking effort to reform its health care system. Health care financing, which is one of the essential control knobs to health care system, has significant influences on the sustainability of the health system, the quality of services it delivers, the health status of the population as well as the success of the whole health care reform process. Objectives This article aims to summarize the evolution of China's health care financing system, its current situation and challenges, discuss what lessons China can learn from the successful experiences or unsuccessful pitfalls of others countries on its health care financing reform. Methods Articles were searched through PubMed and CNKI. Further relevant articles were identified by searching the citations listed in retrieved articles manually. 96 articles were reviewed. Statistics about China's health care system were mainly from government white paper, SHA technical paper, Chinese government websites and WHO website. The information about the performance of health care systems in other countries was mainly from OECD database and WHO website. Results In China, insufficient government expenditure and high out-of-pocket payments; social health insurance providing limited risk protection, with low-level risk pooling; escalation of costs; inefficient financing resources allocation in providers; disparities among regions and provinces all lead to the inequity and inefficiency of the health care financing system and create heavy financial burden on patients. Based on experiences from other countries, the total health expenditure in China could take an even larger proportion of GDP in the future; it is reasonable to increase general government expenditure to further reduce the household out-of-pocket payment and provide financial protection and ensure equity; expanding services coverage and proportion of the costs covered, gradually merging the risk-pool units and different schemes can make social health insurance a more powerful tool to make sure people's access to basic health care; a new payment mechanism and stricter supervision on supply side can effectively contain the escalation of the costs; government should inject more funding to front-line institutions and the function of primary care in China can be stimulated by a good primary health care delivery system, in which the role of primary care provider is clearly defined as the gatekeeper of the health care system, with a proper referral mechanism; more responsibility should be taken by central government to allocate financing resources based on the fiscal capability of local governments; Chinese government should foresee the demand of aging population and take actions before it is too late. Conclusion It is consensus that China's health care reform is heading at the right direction. However, there are a lot of problems in China health care financing system remaining to be solved. Health care financing system varies greatly in each country and there is no perfect health care financing system in the world. Thus no single country can be one hundred percent copied by China. But general principles and one or some most successful and advanced portions of other countries' health care financing systems can still be used as references by China after further assessment. Unsuccessful oversea experiences are also precious lessons for preventing Chinese government from making same mistakes. A good health care financing system should be designed on the basis of a systematic review of all domestic financing policy and previous international experiences. ; published_or_final_version ; Public Health ; Master ; Master of Public Health

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)

This study clarifies the conditions under which learning in games produces convergence to Nash equilibria in practice. We experimentally investigate the role of supermodularity, which is closely related to the more familiar concept of strategic complementarities, in achieving convergence through learning. Using a game from the literature on solutions to externalities, we find that supermodular and "near-supermodular" games converge significantly better than those far below the threshold of supermodularity. From a little below the threshold to the threshold, the improvement is statistically insignificant. Increasing the parameter far beyond the threshold does not significantly improve convergence.