Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test
In: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 737
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In: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 737
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In: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Band 52, Heft no.1, S. 173
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In: University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Band 7, Heft 1
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In: Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, Band 7
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In: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 747
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In: 84 University of Chicago Law Review 37 (2017)
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In: The Journal of Legal Analysis, Forthcoming
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In: Columbia Journal of Tax Law, Band 3, Heft 2
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In: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 832
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In: U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 715
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In: British journal of political science, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 129-153
ISSN: 1469-2112
Prior international political economy public opinion research has primarily examined how economic and socio-cultural factors shape individuals' views on the flows of goods, people and capital. This research has largely ignored whether individuals also care about rewarding or punishing foreign countries for their policies on these issues. We tested this possibility by administering a series of conjoint and traditional survey experiments in the United States and China that examined how reciprocity influences opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. We find that reciprocity is an important determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign investments. This suggests the need to consider the policies that other countries adopt when trying to explain public attitudes toward global economic integration.
The world's biggest consumer markets – the European Union and the United States – have adopted different approaches to regulating competition. This has not only put the EU and US at odds in high-profile investigations of anticompetitive conduct, but also made them race to spread their regulatory models. Using a novel dataset of competition statutes, we investigate this race to influence the world's regulatory landscape and find that the EU's competition laws have been more widely emulated than the US's competition laws. We then argue that both "push" and "pull" factors explain the appeal of the EU's competition regime: the EU actively promotes its model through preferential trade agreements and has an administrative template that is easy to emulate. As EU and US regulators offer competing regulatory models in domains as diverse as privacy, finance, and environmental protection, our study sheds light on how global regulatory races are fought and won.
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 411-443
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (Forthcoming)
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