Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 278-294
ISSN: 1743-9337
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In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 278-294
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 97, Heft 4, S. 754-769
ISSN: 1467-9299
Improving policy deliberation is a central objective for the European Union's institutions. Focusing on the European Parliament's committee hearings as an understudied area of European governance, we aim to understand their role, and their capacity to improve its procedural legitimacy. Building on theoretical work on interest group access and deliberation we argue that hearings can serve three purposes: (i) coordinative; (ii) epistemic; (iii) enhancing public participation. We construct a set of measures and assess an entire population of participants in hearings (2009–14), concentrating on three committees. Our analyses show that hearings serve a hybrid purpose between coordinative and epistemic. At the top end, we observe a core group of gatekeepers representing the dominant constituencies. Simultaneously, research organizations are granted unique access as experts that de‐politicize debates. Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on interest group access while providing an innovative set of tools for its measurement, and the first dataset of its kind.
In: Global policy: gp, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 107-113
ISSN: 1758-5899
AbstractGlobal governance is widely viewed as in crisis. Deepening interdependence of cross‐border activity belies the relative absence of governance mechanisms capable of effectively tackling major global policy challenges. Scholars have an important role to play in understanding blockages and ways through. A first generation of global governance research made visible an increasingly complex and globalising reality beyond the interstate domain. A varied second generation of scholarship, spanning diverse subfields, has built upon this 'signpost scholarship' to generate insight into efforts to manage, bypass and even – potentially – transcend multilateral gridlock to address pressing transboundary problems. This article plots a course towards a 'third generation' of global governance research, serving to also introduce a special section which brings together leading scholars in the field of global governance, working across theoretical, analytical and issue‐area boundaries. This collaborative endeavour proposes to advance a convergence, already underway, across a theoretically and empirically rich existing scholarship, distinguished by a concern for the complexity of global public policy delivery.
In: David Coen and Tom Pegram, 'Introduction', in: D. Coen and T. Pegram (eds.), Major Works Collection: Global Governance II (London: Routledge Press, 2018 Forthcoming).
SSRN
This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European Parliament (EP). Different types of procedures effect committees' demands for legitimacy, impacting the balance of private and public interests. We inspect a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and the entire procedural output across the 7th legislature's (2009-2014) committees. The results indicate that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see greater numbers of private interests involved. However, in committees where the procedures' ratios are inverse we observe greater numbers of public interests involved. While this may overturn the premise of business dominance across the Institution. It has implications regarding the balanced representation of public and private interests on a procedural level. The paper offers a novel approach for framing the nature of the committee, whilst bridging discussions on interest group representation and the democratic deficit.
BASE
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 811-826
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractThis article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal‐typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term 'sliding doors' – namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors – is discerned.
In: Coen , D & Vannoni , M 2016 , ' Sliding doors in Brussels : A career path analysis of EU affairs managers ' , EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH , vol. 55 , no. 4 , pp. 811-826 . https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12151
This article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal-typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term ?sliding doors? ? namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors ? is discerned.
BASE
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 811-826
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 417-420
ISSN: 1468-0491
In: Governance, vol. 28, no. 4, October (2015), pp. 417-420
SSRN
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 20, Heft 8, S. 1104-1119
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 20, Heft 8, S. 1104-1119
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 25, Heft 1
ISSN: 1468-0491
Introduces a special journal issue on how the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was likely to change policy and institutions in their respective fields of interest. Adapted from the source document.
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 5-9
ISSN: 1468-0491
In: Journal of public policy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 49-71
ISSN: 1469-7815
ABSTRACTEuropean networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.