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This article suggests adding a "craftsman" at lower ranks to steer private-sector projects through the Third Offset Strategy. This strategy was established by experienced leadership at the Pentagon to increase military acquisitions of automation and artificial intelligence technology.

Suzanne Nielsen and Hugh Liebert recently published "The Continuing Relevance of Morris Janowitz's The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers" in which they argued that officer education is too enamored with Samuel Huntington's aging theory of civil–military relations from Soldier and the State. Huntington's ideal of objective control grants senior military advisors autonomy within their professional sphere, and it best ensures that unvarnished military expertise survives politically charged national security decision making processes intact, regardless of which party controls the White House. While these features explain Huntington's traditional popularity with the military, Nielsen and Liebert warn that Huntington's separation between military and civilian matters in theory engenders wishful thinking in practice, so much so that officers neglect, to the detriment of national policy, Morris Janowitz, Huntington's cofounder of the modern study of civil–military relations. However, the civil–military community should reconsider banishing Huntington in order to appreciate Janowitz.

Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military's inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle's practical wisdom and Machiavelli's virtú.

The proof for "War Is in the Error Term," a piece that appeared in the Summer 1999 issue of International Organization, contains a subtle error. Once the correction is made, there are broader implications for testing theories of war using quantitative studies. Large-n tests to verify the incomplete information explanation for war will be more difficult to perform than originally anticipated.

Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military's inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle's practical wisdom and Machiavelli's virtú.

Recent research on U.S. civil-military relations has applied principal-agent logic to analyze the post-cold war friction between civilian authorities and top military commanders. This article proposes a greater emphasis on bargaining to focus on the effects of new monitoring technologies available to the civilian principal in the information age. As monitoring capabilities increase and military agents perceive their autonomy disappearing, tacit bargaining over the president's level of resource commitment to a crisis should become more prevalent. This idea receives support from a comparison across case studies of the limited use of force taken from different technological eras. A new style of civil-military bargaining presents both challenges and opportunities to the traditional conception of military professionalism.