Comparative statics in Cournot free entry equilibrium
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 155-168
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 155-168
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 106, S. 1-10
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 20, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1704
AbstractDisequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on the possible speed of adjustment when arbitrage among periods is feasible and the surplus loss. We find that incentive compatible sequential trade through a disequilibrium path is only compatible with sluggish price adjustments and sufficiently impatient agents. Thus, price adjustment does not depend on excess demand alone but on arbitrage opportunities and the willingness of agents to engage on them. We find that the upper bound on the speed of price adjustment involves a lower bound for the social surplus loss, whatever the kind of rationing. The reason is that even when the market price converges to the surplus maximizing value, as it happens when rationing is efficient, some pieces of surplus are not attainable at the current period due to arbitrage. Moreover, faster price adjustments do not imply less surplus loss, because the effect of price changes on transactions via arbitrage. Finally, under weaker-than-efficient rationing there is a one period incentive compatible trading procedure in which most of the surplus is destroyed. The procedure has the property that almost every agent in the market trades.
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 279-300
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractWe model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits is skewed in favor of the more efficient firm. Consumer surplus and social welfare also increase in many cases, although those effects are generally ambiguous.
We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We study the evolution of political power and show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield political power to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible. We also show that high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes. We call this political unemployment. ; Thanks to the MOMA network under the Project ECO2014-57673-REDT for financial support. The first author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. Luis Corchon and Antonio Romero-Medina acknowledge financial support from MEC under Project ECO2014_57442_P, and financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants MYGRANT and MDM 2014-0431.
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We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whomto hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in threeclasses, high, medium and low productivity.We study the evolution of political powerand show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield politicalpower to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible.We also showthat high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes.We call this political unemployment ; Thanks to the MOMA network under the Project ECO2014-57673-REDT for financial support. The first author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. Luis Corchon and Antonio Romero-Medina acknowledge financial support from MEC under Project ECO2014_57442_P, and financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants MYGRANT and MDM 2014-0431.
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