Suchergebnisse

This book reveals, for the first time, a hitherto unexplored dimension of Britain's engagement with the post-war Middle East: the counter-subversive policies and measures conducted by the British Intelligence and Security Services and he Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office, Britain's secret propaganda apparatus.

"Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac reveal the remarkable relationship between the British Royal Family and the intelligence community, from the reign of Queen Victoria, through two world wars and the Cold War, to the present day. Based on painstaking archival research, the authors have uncovered a wealth of detail that changes our understanding of the role of the monarch in modern British politics, intelligence, and international relations. Far from being a dry tome, on page after page Crown, Cloak, and Dagger offers surprising revelations and stories of intrigue. The book begins with the reign of Queen Victoria, when persistent attempts to assassinate her demanded the creation of security services. Successive queens and kings have all played an active role in steering British intelligence, sometimes running parallel networks against the wishes of prime ministers. Even today, Queen Elizabeth II receives "copy No.1" of every intelligence report and likely knows more state secrets than any person alive. This book demonstrates that even in the era of constitutional monarchy, queens and kings continue to be far more than figureheads of state. Crown, Cloak, and Dagger is a fascinating and fast-paced history that will inform as well as entertain anyone with an interest in history, espionage, and the Royal Family"--

Introduction: Covert action -- Part one: Cold war (1. False starts: fromcounter-attack to liberation ; 2. Operation Valuable: defending Greece, detaching Albania ; 3. Pinpricks: the early Cold War ; 4. A long game: exploring rifts behind the Iron Curtain) -- Part two: The end of Empire (5. Operation Boot: regime change in Iran ; 6. Expansion: covert action before Suez ; 7. Interdependence: covert action after Suez ; 8. Decolonization and drift: the battle for influence after Empire ; 9. Militarization: secret wars in Yemen and Indonesia) -- Part three: Age of illusions (10. Operations Storm and Beyond: from Latin America to Oman ; 11. Troubles: covert action in northern Ireland ; 12. Containment: the Second Coldv war ; 13. Transition: the new agenda ; 14. Counter-terrorism: disrupting threats, managing risks) -- Conclusion: The British way

For generations scholars have defined covert action as plausibly deniable interventions in the affairs of others; the sponsor's hand is neither apparent nor acknowledged. We challenge this orthodoxy. Turning the spotlight away from covert action and onto plausible deniability itself, we argue that even in its supposed heyday, the concept was deeply problematic. Changes in technology and the media, combined with the rise of special forces and private military companies, gives it even less credibility today. We live in an era of implausible deniability and ambiguous warfare. Paradoxically, this does not spell the end of covert action. Instead, leaders are embracing implausible deniability and the ambiguity it creates. We advance a new conception of covert action, historically grounded but fit for the twenty-first century: unacknowledged interference in the affairs of others.

In 2011 William Hague, then British Foreign Secretary, authorized a Special Forces team to enter Libya and attempt to contact rebels opposed to Muammar Gaddafi in the unfolding civil war. However, its members were detained by the rebels, questioned and ejected from the country. This article puts the literature on public policy failures into dialogue with that on covert action as a tool of foreign policy. It asks: why did this not develop into a fully-fledged policy fiasco when journalists and politicians alike judged it to have been a major error of judgement on Hague's part? Using narrative analysis of the contemporary reporting of this incident, we argue that the government – possessing the advantage of information asymmetry accruing from operational secrecy – was ultimately able to win the battle of narratives in a frame contestation process. The study of information asymmetry can enhance the recently revivified research into foreign policy failures.

This article adds to the intersubjective research into policy failures by analysing the furore that erupted in UK politics over the sinking in May 1982 of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War. The article examines the ways in which the Thatcher government initially tried to conceal what had really happened and how, over time, the revelations piled up and the sinking came to be narrated as a serious case of government wrongdoing. To interpret the challenges interested parties in politics and the media faced in holding the government to account, the article develops a new analytical framework for making sense of the ways in which secrecy and acknowledgement interplay in the construction of failure narratives. It argues that elite control over information subtly shapes both the willingness and ability of interested parties to contest official government positions, resulting in a series of theoretical and policy facing conclusions.

Covert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case of 'the golden age of CIA operations'. The socially constructed nature of success has important implications not just for evaluating covert actions but also for using, and defending against, them.

AbstractCovert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case of 'the golden age of CIA operations'. The socially constructed nature of success has important implications not just for evaluating covert actions but also for using, and defending against, them.