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Green and Shapiro have argued that rational choice theory has produced virtually no new propositions about politics that have been carefully tested and not found wanting; and that an empirically successful rational choice theory would be no more universal than the middle-level theories that they advocate. In this essay I argue four main points. First, Pathologies of Rational Choice Analysis was much better designed to illustrate methodological failings than to sustain a global claim that rational choice theory has made no empirical contributions. Second, there is empirically confirmed content specific to rational choice theory, enough to make it the vital and exciting research program that it is. Third, there is a sense in which rational choice is more universal than its predecessors. Fourth, to provide a full evaluation of the scientific value of any theory one needs to consider both theoretical and empirical success.

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system. What appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the M + 1 rule, according to which strategic voting in M-seat districts produces exactly M + 1 vote-getting candidates in equilibrium, any others having their support totally undercut. This result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for Reed's recent extension of Duverger's Law to the Japanese case. The model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the M + 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium. I test these hypotheses with Japanese data. Finally, the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts. I use Japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting.

Theoretisch

THIS PAPER FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON SYSTEMS IN WHICH EACH VOTER HAS A SINGLE (NON-TRANSFERABLE) VOTE. FOR SUCH SYSTEMS, IT SHOWS THAT, IF THE DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE SUPPORT AMONG PARTIES ARE HELD CONSTANT AND SOME EMPIRICALLY ATTAINABLE CONDITIONS ARE MET, THEN THE D'HONDT PR FORMULA AND THE PLURALITY RULE FORMULA WILL YIELD IDENTICAL SEAT ALLOCATIONS. THIS RESULT WILL SEEM LESS SURPRISING ONCE THE DEFINITION OF PLURALITY RULE IS UNDERSTOOD, BUT WILL REMAIN INSTRUCTIVE. THE PAPER ALSO SHOWS THAT, DISTRICT MAGNITUDE HELD CONSTANT, D'HONDT AND PLURALITY RULE HAVE IDENTICAL THRESHOLDS OF EXCLUSION. THESE TECHNICAL RESULTS ARE USED TO ILLUSTRATE BROADER TERMINOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE.