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Americans have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a fact that has been successfully exploited by generations of U.S. Air Force leaders in information campaigns. But as a result, the nation has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish, creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially in recent conflicts. Adaptive enemies have also become very adept at using their own carefully crafted information campaigns to counter what is America's greatest asymmetric advantage on the battlefield. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1387/thumbnail.jpg

As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such terms. The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it now faces. The author asserts that the Army must change in order to operate effectively in the full spectrum of future requirements, and it is time to reexamine the war in Vietnam. He also draws attention to the service's "Lessons Learned" process, and provides insights as to how the experience gained in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM should be analyzed and applied. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1813/thumbnail.jpg

The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities; execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat operations. The author asserts that these obligations require the Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to do so places critical missions at risk around the world could lead to replacement of operational "victory" in the war on terrorism with strategic failure, as regional instability increases around the world. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1819/thumbnail.jpg

The ideas and issues presented in this collection of papers from the Twelfth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War College in April 2001 will educate and inform anyone interested in the past and future course of American defense reform. Though conference attendees had many differing opinions about the barriers to defense transformation and how to overcome them, a broad consensus formed that some change is essential to meet future security requirements. They observed at the time that it is ironic that the peace which creates the prosperity and wealth to fund transformation and permits a window of time to achieve it, also decreases public interest and urgency to accomplish it. The terrible events of September 11, 2001, appear to have dispelled public disinterest in the nation s military capabilities, and may provide increased impetus for the drive for defense reform. If the opportunity is squandered, or the wrong choices are made, the costs to the nation someday could be catastrophic. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1047/thumbnail.jpg

The ideas and issues presented in this collection of papers from the Twelfth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War College in April 2001 will educate and inform anyone interested in the past and future course of American defense reform. Though conference attendees had many differing opinions about the barriers to defense transformation and how to overcome them, a broad consensus formed that some change is essential to meet future security requirements. They observed at the time that it is ironic that the peace which creates the prosperity and wealth to fund transformation and permits a window of time to achieve it, also decreases public interest and urgency to accomplish it. The terrible events of September 11, 2001, appear to have dispelled public disinterest in the nation s military capabilities, and may provide increased impetus for the drive for defense reform. If the opportunity is squandered, or the wrong choices are made, the costs to the nation someday could be catastrophic. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1097/thumbnail.jpg

The author analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 smaller-scale contingencies conducted by the United States during the last decade. He divides such contingencies into engagement, enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military's role in each one. The author especially emphasizes the recurring problems in the planning, execution, and force structure for stabilization tasks, including nation-building. He concludes that, despite the desire of American leaders to limit military involvement in such missions, it is unavoidable because of the capability mismatch between military and civilian organizations, combined with the requirements of peace operations and the character of American soldiers. Recommendations include acceptance of some degree of nation-building as the Army's mission and adapting its force structure, training, and planning accordingly. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1840/thumbnail.jpg

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have to address all the relevant issues about the future course of American national security strategy and provide useful recommendations to the new administration as it develops a new security strategy. The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies convened a conference on "Alternative Military Strategies for the United States" to highlight the key issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and the new administration's security planning. This report summarizes the presentations from a distinguished group of panelists that included many prominent American commentators on national security issues. The report closes with an analysis of the most important issues that must be resolved to produce a viable national security strategy for the new millennium. This strategy will require some combination of new mission priorities, additional force structure, and Department of Defense economizing. This report provides a useful overview of the various positions in those areas, and is a good starting point for those trying to grasp the intricacies of future QDR debates. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1123/thumbnail.jpg