Suchergebnisse

This essay attempts to go beyond presenting the bits and pieces of - still ongoing - crisis management in the EU. Instead it attempts at finding the 'red thread' behind a series of politcally improvized decisions. Our fundamental research question asks, if basic economic lessons learned in the 1970s are still valid. Namely that crises that emanate either from structural or regulatory weaknesses can and should not be remedied by demand management. Our second research question is the following. Can a lacking internal committment and conviction in any member-state be replaced or substituted by external pressure or formalized procedures and sanctions? Under those angles we analyze the project on establishing a fiscal and banking union in the EU, as approved by the December, 2012 Council.

This paper offers a broad overview of the Hungarian development strategy over the past two decades. Combining historical and functional analysis, some major strengths and weaknesses are identified, with special emphasis on the country's open-door policies and the role played by the European Union. The paper investigates why the impetus of institutional and financial integration was lost by about 2004 when policy drifting took over the role of strategies. Some ideas on how to remedy the situation are being offered. Paradoxically, the Hungarian success and failure both testify to the relevance of a neoinstitutionalist/political economy approach to sustainable development. It also examines the limitations of external anchoring by the EU as well as of the spontaneous bottom-up evolution of institutions when policy drifting continues.