Suchergebnisse

Governments in the advanced industrial countries increasingly rely on supply-side reforms to intervene in the economy.
This article examines one such reform, that of vocational education and training in France, whose successful
implementation required that private actors cooperate not with the state, but with each other. As demonstrated through an
empirical analysis of two employment zones, theories of institutional design that underscore the necessity of
sanctioning cannot explain the successful emergence of cooperation, because new sanctioning regimes lack credibility
under the uncertain conditions of economic reform. The primary obstacle to successful implementation of these reforms
is uncertainty about the consequences of reciprocal cooperation, and the article highlights the mutual roles of states
and employers' associations in overcoming this uncertainty. Active collaboration between policymakers and employers'
associations, which have uniquely good access to private information about firms, is necessary to enable state policies
to target those firms which are the most likely potential cooperators.

Governments in advanced industrial countries increasingly rely on supply-side reforms to intervene in the economy. This article examines one such reform: vocational education & training in France, whose successful implementation required that private actors cooperate not with the state, but with each other. Theories of institutional design that underscore the necessity of sanctioning cannot explain the successful emergence of cooperation, because new sanctioning regimes lack credibility under the uncertain conditions of economic reform. The primary obstacle to successful implementation of these reforms is uncertainty about the consequences of reciprocal cooperation, & the article highlights the mutual roles of states & employers' associations in overcoming this uncertainty. Active collaboration between policymakers & employers' association, which have uniquely good access to private information about firms, is necessary to enable state policies to target those firms that are the most likely potential cooperators. 41 References. Adapted from the source document.

Explores conditions which determine success or failure of supply-side policies developing mutual cooperation amongst private companies with conflicting interests; case study of metal employers in the French employment zones of Valley of the Arve and the Vimeu.

The central challenge of transferring the dual system of education and training to eastern Germany is to convince companies to bear the in-firm costs of apprenticeship training. Two prominent explanatory variables in the social scientificliterature - national institutions and social capital - offer certain predictions aboutwhich factors will be most important in facilitating the transfer of the dual system toeastern Germany. Data from interviews with thirty-four firms in the metal andelectronics industry suggest that institutionalist theory mis-specifies the role ofemployers in coordinated market economies. Employers' associations in both eastern and western Germany have neither the access to inside information nor theinformal sanctioning capacity attributed to them in this literature, nor do they play anyrole in the regular diffusion of strategies of best practice. Ownership by westernGerman companies, however, appears to be of particular significance in the decisionof eastern German companies to train, a link which may support the institutional emphasis on access to long-term finance. Social capital is unable to explainsignificant variance in the ability of companies to cooperate in order to create additional apprenticeship places. The role of policy design in the new federal statesappears to have an important effect in explaining the ability of firms in some states tocooperate in training apprentices. The ability to craft effective policies depends oncoordination among state governments and employers' organizations, but the distributive conflicts inherent in these subsidies can hamper cooperation among employers. ; Die zentrale Herausforderung bei der Übertragung des dualen Berufsausbildungssystems nach Ostdeutschland ist es, die Unternehmen davon zuüberzeugen, die internen Kosten der Ausbildung zu tragen. Besonders zwe iVariablen in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur - das nationale Institutionengefüge und das Sozialkapital - weisen auf vorab benennbare Faktoren hin, die wichtig sind, um den Transfer des dualen Systems nach Ostdeutschland zuerleichtern.Informationen und Daten aus Interviews in 34 Unternehmen der Metall- und Elektronikindustrie führen zu der Annahme, daß die Institutionen-Theorie die Rolle von Unternehmern in "koordinierten Marktwirtschaften" mißinterpretiert.Unternehmensverbände in Ost- und Westdeutschland haben weder Zugang zu Insider-Informationen noch eine wie auch immer geartete Sanktionsmöglichkeit - wieihnen in der Literatur zugeschrieben wird -, und sie spielen auch keine Rolle in derüblichen Verbreitung von "best-practice"-Erfahrungen. Wenn ein Unternehmen in Ostdeutschland einem westdeutschen Unternehmen gehört, so scheint dies allerdings eine wichtige Rolle bei der Entscheidung für eine berufliche Erstausbildung in dem ostdeutschen Unternehmen zu spielen. Dies könnte in einemZusammenhang mit der Diskussion um die Bedeutung von Institutionen und dabei um den Zugang zu langfristigem Kapital gesehen werden.Die These vom "Sozialen Kapital" kann die erheblichen Unterschiede in der Fähigkeitder Unternehmen, durch Kooperation zusätzliche Ausbildungsplätze zu schaffen, nicht erklären. Die je spezifische Art, wie politische Prozesse in den neuen Bundesländern gestaltet werden, scheint dagegen ein wichtiger Indikator zu sein, umdie in einigen Bundesländern vorhandene Kooperationsfähigkeit von Unternehmenbei der Lehrlingsausbildung zu erklären.Die Fähigkeit, wirksame politische Lösungen zu entwickeln, hängt von der Art der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Länderregierungen und Unternehmensverbänden ab, doch können Verteilungskonflikte, die immanent zu Subventionen gehören, dieKooperation zwischen Unternehmern behindern

Abstract
The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 is the most comprehensive reform of American finance since the Great Depression and an ideal case to study how public opinion can counter the political power of finance. This article shows how pivotal congressional hearings created a clear story line for American media, one built around the way in which the investment bank Goldman Sachs made money during the crisis. We demonstrate that Goldman and CEO Lloyd Blankfein became the face of finance during these hearings. Results from a 2016 online survey experiment enable us to examine whether media portrayals highlighting the personal attributes of Blankfein and Goldman's deal-making activate public opinion differently than articles foregrounding conflict of interest regulation and Goldman. Compared to the control condition, focus on Blankfein as the face of banking triggers negative affective response, greater appetite for regulating markets and greater attribution of blame toward banks for the financial crisis.

This article articulates a distinctive source of political influence of some technology firms, which we call platform power. Platform power inheres in companies of economic scale that provide the terms of access through which large numbers of consumers access goods, services, and information. Firms with platform power benefit from a deference from policymakers, but this deference is not primarily a function of direct influence through lobbying or campaign contributions, nor does it come from the threat of disinvestment. Companies with platform power instead benefit from the tacit allegiance of consumers, who can prove a formidable source of opposition to regulations that threaten these platforms. Focusing on the critical role played by consumers in explaining the powers platform firms wield in the rich democracies lends insight as well into their distinctive vulnerabilities, which flow from events that split the consumer–platform alliance or that cue citizen, as opposed to consumer, political identities.