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One of the most contested questions in the social sciences is whether people behave rationally. A large body of work assumes that individuals do in fact make rational economic, political, and social decisions. Yet hundreds of experiments suggest that this is not the case. Framing effects constitute one of the most stunning and influential demonstrations of irrationality. The effects not only challenge the foundational assumptions of much of the social sciences (e.g., the existence of coherent preferences or stable attitudes), but also lead many scholars to adopt alternative approaches (e.g., prospect theory). Surprisingly, virtually no work has sought to specify the political conditions under which framing effects occur. I fill this gap by offering a theory and experimental test. I show how contextual forces (e.g., elite competition, deliberation) and individual attributes (e.g., expertise) affect the success of framing. The results provide insight into when rationality assumptions apply and, also, have broad implications for political psychology and experimental methods.

A growing body of evidence suggests that campaigns affect voters by priming the criteria on which voters base their decisions. Yet virtually all of this work uses simulated campaign rhetoric and/or relies on indirect measures of vote choice. This paper combines a content analysis of media campaign coverage with an Election Day exit poll to explore the impact of a real‐world campaign—the 2000 campaign for the U.S. Senate in Minnesota—on voters' decisions. In this case, the campaign did in fact prime exposed and attentive voters to base their decisions on the issues and images emphasized in the campaign. Such campaign effects were reinforced by interpersonal discussions. The results constitute the first demonstration of priming effects in a U.S. election with voters at the polls.

Public opinion often depends on which frames elites choose to use. For example, citizens' opinions about a Ku Klux Klan rally may depend on whether elites frame it as a free speech issue or a public safety issue. An important concern is that elites face few constraints to using frames to influence & manipulate citizens' opinions. No work has investigated the limits of framing effects. In this article, these limits are explored by focusing on one particular constraint -- the credibility of the frame's source. Two laboratory experiments suggest that elites face a clear & systematic constraint to using frames to influence & manipulate public opinion. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

Most studies of coalition behavior have treated political parties as unitary actors. Building on extant literature, this paper relaxes the unitary actor assumption in order to develop a theory about the impact of party factionalism on cabinet duration. Specifically, cabinets composed of factionalized parties are expected to exhibit less stability. Cross-national data corroborate the hypothesis, demonstrating the importance of intra-party characteristics in determining coalition behavior.