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In: Human relations: towards the integration of the social sciences, Band 64, Heft 12, S. 1529-1530
ISSN: 1573-9716, 1741-282X
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In: Human relations: towards the integration of the social sciences, Band 64, Heft 12, S. 1529-1530
ISSN: 1573-9716, 1741-282X
In: American communist history, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 115-118
ISSN: 1474-3906
In: Labour history: a journal of labour and social history, Heft 101, S. 195
ISSN: 1839-3039
In: Cold war history, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 469-492
ISSN: 1743-7962
In: Cold war history: a Frank Cass journal, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 469-493
ISSN: 1468-2745
In: Labour history: a journal of labour and social history, Heft 99, S. 277
ISSN: 1839-3039
In: Labour history: a journal of labour and social history, Heft 98, S. 183
ISSN: 1839-3039
In: American communist history, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 167-196
ISSN: 1474-3906
In: Social theory & health, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 342-363
ISSN: 1477-822X
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 346-366
ISSN: 1743-9019
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 29-54
ISSN: 1520-3972
In 1948, at a time of severe economic austerity, the British Labour government committed itself to a costly and protracted campaign against a Communist foe in the Far East, despite not having any U.S. support for the endeavor. Clement Attlee's government in Britain argued that the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was necessary to counter Soviet attempts to use the local Communist party in support of Moscow's expansionist designs. Subsequently, many commentators and historians accepted this judgment, at least to some degree. In reality, the rebellion, far from being carefully coordinated or meticulously organized, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. The 1948 insurrection cannot be understood without recognizing the influence of indigenous pressures and internal developments, which were more crucial than the external Cold War dimension. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 29-54
ISSN: 1531-3298
In 1948, at a time of severe economic austerity, the British Labour government committed itself to a costly and protracted campaign against a Communist foe in the Far East, despite not having any U.S. support for the endeavor. Clement Attlee's government in Britain argued that the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) was necessary to counter Soviet attempts to use the local Communist party in support of Moscow's expansionist designs. Subsequently, many commentators and historians accepted this judgment, at least to some degree. In reality, the rebellion, far from being carefully coordinated or meticulously organized, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. The 1948 insurrection cannot be understood without recognizing the influence of indigenous pressures and internal developments, which were more crucial than the external Cold War dimension.
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 44, Heft 5, S. 29
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 346-366
ISSN: 0268-4527
In: Cold war history, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 177-204
ISSN: 1743-7962