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The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. Often the allocation of seats to districts is pre-determined and furthermore distorted ---meaning that the ratios of the number of assigned seats to population size vary significantly across districts. The paper surveys proposed bi-apportionment methods with a focus on the conflict that may arise between party-proportional representation under district distortions.

This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In contrast with other types of restrictions such as single-peakedness, intermediate preferences allow for a clear distinction between restrictions on the set of preferences characteristics and those on the set of alternatives.

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. Often the allocation of seats to districts is pre-determined and furthermore distorted ---meaning that the ratios of the number of assigned seats to population size vary significantly across districts. The paper surveys proposed bi-apportionment methods with a focus on the conflict that may arise between party-proportional representation under district distortions.

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main focus of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms as well as their implementation.

This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In contrast with other types of restrictions such as single-peakedness, intermediate preferences allow for a clear distinction between restrictions on the set of preferences characteristics and those on the set of alternatives.

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main focus of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms as well as their implementation.

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main focus of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms as well as their implementation.

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. Often the allocation of seats to districts is pre-determined and furthermore distorted ---meaning that the ratios of the number of assigned seats to population size vary significantly across districts. The paper surveys proposed bi-apportionment methods with a focus on the conflict that may arise between party-proportional representation under district distortions.

This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In contrast with other types of restrictions such as single-peakedness, intermediate preferences allow for a clear distinction between restrictions on the set of preferences characteristics and those on the set of alternatives.

An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.

The first pillars of social security systems widely differ across European countries both in the contribution rate and intra-generational redistribution. What would be the impact of these differences if EU citizens had free access to all systems? This paper aims to highlight some basic features of this question in a very simple two countries model. ; Les régimes de retraite de base des divers pays européens diffèrent par le niveau de leur taux de cotisation et par la redistribution effectuée au sein d'une même génération de retraités. Quel serait l'impact de ces différences si les citoyens de l'Union Européenne pouvaient choisir librement entre les divers régimes ? Nous tentons ici d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse à cette question en analysant un modèle très simple à deux pays.

An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.

An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.

The first pillars of social security systems widely differ across European countries both in the contribution rate and intra-generational redistribution. What would be the impact of these differences if EU citizens had free access to all systems? This paper aims to highlight some basic features of this question in a very simple two countries model. ; Les régimes de retraite de base des divers pays européens diffèrent par le niveau de leur taux de cotisation et par la redistribution effectuée au sein d'une même génération de retraités. Quel serait l'impact de ces différences si les citoyens de l'Union Européenne pouvaient choisir librement entre les divers régimes ? Nous tentons ici d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse à cette question en analysant un modèle très simple à deux pays.

An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.