Suchergebnisse

Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such regulatory measures.

Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.

ABSTRACTThis paper applies contest theory to provide an integrated framework of a team sports league and analyzes the competitive interaction between clubs. We show that dissipation of the league revenue arises from 'overinvestment' in playing talent as a direct consequence of the ruinous competitive interaction between clubs. This overinvestment problem increases if the discriminatory power of the contest function increases, revenue‐sharing decreases, and the size of an additional exogenous prize increases. We further show that clubs invest more when they play in an open league compared with a closed league. Moreover, the overinvestment problem within open leagues increases with the revenue differential between leagues.

This paper applies contest theory to provide an integrated framework of a team sports league and analyzes the competitive interaction between clubs. We show that dissipation of the league revenue arises from 'overinvestment' in playing talent as a direct consequence of the ruinous competitive interaction between clubs. This overinvestment problem increases if the discriminatory power of the contest function increases, revenue-sharing decreases, and the size of an additional exogenous prize increases. We further show that clubs invest more when they play in an open league compared with a closed league. Moreover, the overinvestment problem within open leagues increases with the revenue differential between leagues.

AbstractThis paper analyzes spillover effects in sports leagues that are embedded in a system of promotion and relegation. Based on a contest model of a professional sports league with a top division and a second division, we show that league prizes and club efficiencies have opposing effects; while a stronger second division that offers a higher league prize leads to a more balanced top division, the opposite is true for a stronger second division whose clubs become more cost efficient. Moreover, we demonstrate that a higher second‐division prize induces a lower investment level, but higher profits in the top division, while higher club efficiency in the second division leads to both a lower investment level and lower profits in the top division. These results have important policy implications for the organization of sports leagues.

Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Untersuchung wird eine Methodik zur Prognose des sportlichen Erfolgs eines Fußballunternehmens in der Bundesliga aufgezeigt. Um der begrenzten Prognostizierbarkeit des sportlichen Erfolgs Rechnung zu tragen, berücksichtigt das Prognosemodell neben der relativen Spielergehaltssumme, dem relativen Trainergehalt und der Vereinseffizienz explizit den Zufall als Einflussgröße. Das Prognosemodell wird dabei mit Hilfe einer empirischen Untersuchung der Spielzeiten 1996/1997 bis 2002/2003 validiert und spezifiziert. Die Prognose des sportlichen Erfolgs erfolgt mittels Monte-Carlo-Simuladon. Dementsprechend liefert das Prognosemodell keinen einzelnen Erwartungswert für die Platzierung, sondern eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung. Hieraus lassen sich Wahrscheinlichkeiten für unterschiedliche sportliche Szenarien, wie z.B. den Gewinn der Deutschen Meisterschaft oder die Champions League-Qualifikation, ableiten. Die so ermittelte Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der Platzierung ist wiederum geeignet, für die Einnahmenverteilung eines Fußballunternehmens ebenfalls Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu ermitteln.

Empirical studies show that first- and second-generation immigrants are less likely to be members of sports clubs than their non-immigrant peers. Common explanations are cultural differences and socioeconomic disadvantages. However, lower participation rates in amateur sport could be at least partly due to ethnic discrimination. Are minority ethnic groups granted the same right to belong as their non-immigrant peers? To answer this question, this paper uses publicly available data from a field experiment in which mock applications were sent out to over 1,600 football clubs in Germany. Having a foreign-sounding name significantly reduces the likelihood of being invited to participate. The paper concludes that amateur football clubs are not as permeable as they are often perceived to be. It claims that traditional explanations for lower participation rates of immigrants need to be revisited.

This paper presents data of field experiments that analyze discrimination in amateur soccer. The studies created fake accounts and asked amateur soccer coaches to come for a trial practice. The fake accounts had either a native- or a foreign-sounding name. The dataset is based on three published studies that analyzed discrimination in 23 countries. The dataset contains 24,915 observations and several variables that are interesting for further research. This data can be used to compare discrimination in amateur soccer with discrimination in diverse fields, such as migration, economics, or political science. For a more detailed discussion, please see the published articles.