Suchergebnisse

A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT A PLURALITY ELECTION NEED NOT REFLECT THE TRUE SENTIMENTS OF THE ELECTORATE. SOME OF THE PROPOSED REFORM PROCEDURES, SUCH AS APPROVAL AND CUMULATIVE VOTING, SHARE THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS TO TALLY EACH VOTER'S PREFERENCES. VOTING SYSTEMS THAT PERMIT TRUNCATED BALLOTS SHARE THIS FEATURE. THE ELECTION RESULTS FOR ANY SUCH PROCEDURE CAN BE HIGHLY INDETERMINATE; ALL POSSIBLE ELECTION RESULTS CAN OCCUR WITH THE SAME CHOICE OF SINCERE VOTERS. THIS CONCLUSION OF INDETERMINACY HOLDS EVEN WHEN MEASURES OF VOTERS' SENTIMENTS, SUCH AS THE EXISTENCE OF A CONDORCET WINNER OR EVEN MUCH STRONGER MEASURES, INDICATE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE AGREEMENT AMONG THE VOTERS. THEN, MULTIPLE SYSTEMS ARE COMPARED WITH ALL STANDARD TALLYING PROCEDURES. FOR INSTANCE, A COROLLARY ASSERTS IT IS PROBABLE FOR THE PLURALITY VOTING METHOD TO ELECT THE CONDORCET WINNER WHILE APPROVAL VOTING HAS AN INDETERMINATE OUTCOME.

The contemporary global community is increasingly interdependent and confronted with systemic risks posed by the actions and interactions of actors existing beneath the level of formal institutions, often operating outside effective governance structures. Frequently, these actors are human agents, such as rogue traders or aggressive financial innovators, terrorists, groups of dissidents, or unauthorized sources of sensitive or secret information about government or private sector activities. In other instances, influential "actors" take the form of climate change, communications technologies, or socioeconomic globalization. Although these individual forces may be small relative to state governments or international institutions, or may operate on long time scales, the changes they catalyze can pose significant challenges to the analysis and practice of international relations through the operation of complex feedbacks and interactions of individual agents and interconnected systems. We call these challenges "femtorisks," and emphasize their importance for two reasons. First, in isolation, they may be inconsequential and semiautonomous; but when embedded in complex adaptive systems, characterized by individual agents able to change, learn from experience, and pursue their own agendas, the strategic interaction between actors can propel systems down paths of increasing, even global, instability. Second, because their influence stems from complex interactions at interfaces of multiple systems (e.g., social, financial, political, technological, ecological, etc.), femtorisks challenge standard approaches to risk assessment, as higher-order consequences cascade across the boundaries of socially constructed complex systems. We argue that new approaches to assessing and managing systemic risk in international relations are required, inspired by principles of evolutionary theory and development of resilient ecological systems.