Suchergebnisse

RésuméNos sociétés vivent‐elles aujourd'hui une nouvelle révolution industrielle? Les auteurs s'efforcent de répondre à cette question à partir d'une évaluation des conséquences des changements technologiques sur le tissu socio‐économique actuel, notamment sous l'angle de l'emploi, des inégalités, des conditions de travail et des relations professionnelles. Ils avancent que les processus d'innovation et la diffusion de «l'automatisation intelligente» risquent de renforcer des schémas de répartition des revenus et des rapports de force inéquitables (certains préexistants à l'arrivée des technologies et d'autres apparus au cours des trente à quarante dernières années). Ils détaillent les implications de ces évolutions sur les politiques à mettre en œuvre.

ResumenEn este artículo se investiga si las sociedades asisten a una nueva revolución industrial, y cuál es la repercusión del cambio tecnológico en el tejido socioeconómico, principalmente con respecto al empleo, la distribución de la renta, las condiciones de trabajo y las relaciones laborales. Los autores sostienen que los procesos de innovación y la expansión de lo que denominan «automatización inteligente» tienden a exacerbar los actuales patrones de desigualdad de poder y de renta, que ya estaban presentes mucho antes la aparición de las tecnologías en cuestión. A tenor de esos procesos, proponen algunas recomendaciones para la formulación de políticas.

AbstractThis article considers whether societies are witnessing another industrial revolution in the light of an assessment of the impact of technological change on today's socio‐economic fabric, especially with respect to employment, income distribution, working conditions and labour relations. The authors argue that the processes of innovation and the spread of what they term "intelligent automation" are likely to exacerbate incumbent patterns of uneven income distribution and power, some of which existed well before the arrival of the technologies concerned, while others have emerged over the past 30 to 40 years. They venture to consider policy implications on the basis of such developments.

In this paper, we study the effects of industrial policies on international convergence using a multi-country agent-based model which builds upon Dosi et al. (2019b). The model features a group of microfounded economies, with evolving industries, populated by heterogeneous firms that compete in international markets. In each country, technological change is driven by firms' activities of search and innovation, while aggregate demand formation and distribution follows Keynesian dynamics. Interactions among countries take place via trade flows and international technological imitation. We employ the model to assess the different strategies that laggard countries can adopt to catch up with leaders: market-friendly policies;industrial policies targeting the development of firms' capabilities and R&D investments, as well as trade restrictions for infant industry protection; protectionist policies focusing on tariffs only. We find that markets cannot do the magic: in absence of government interventions, laggards will continue to fall behind. On the contrary, industrial policies can successfully drive international convergence among leaders and laggards, while protectionism alone is not necessary to support catching up and countries get stuck in a sort of middle-income trap. Finally, in a global trade war, where developed economies impose retaliatory tariffs, both laggards and leaders are worse off and world productivity growth slows down.

In this paper, we study the effects of industrial policies on international convergence using a multi-country agent-based model which builds upon Dosi et al. (2019b). The model features a group of microfounded economies, with evolving industries, populated by heterogeneous firms that compete in international markets. In each country, technological change is driven by firms' activities of search and innovation, while aggregate demand formation and distribution follows Keynesian dynamics. Interactions among countries take place via trade flows and international technological imitation. We employ the model to assess the different strategies that laggard countries can adopt to catch up with leaders: market-friendly policies; industrial policies targeting the development of firms' capabilities and R&D investments, as well as trade restrictions for infant industry protection; protectionist policies focusing on tariffs only. We find that markets cannot do the magic: in absence of government interventions, laggards will continue to fall behind. On the contrary, industrial policies can successfully drive international convergence among leaders and laggards, while protectionism alone is not necessary to support catching up and countries get stuck in a sort of middle-income trap. Finally, in a global trade war, where developed economies impose retaliatory tariffs, both laggards and leaders are worse off and world productivity growth slows down.

In this paper, we study the effects of industrial policies on international convergence using a multi-country agent-based model which builds upon Dosi et al. (2019b). The model features a group of microfounded economies, with evolving industries, populated by heterogeneous firms that compete in international markets. In each country, technological change is driven by firms' activities of search and innovation, while aggregate demand formation and distribution follows Keynesian dynamics. Interactions among countries take place via trade flows and international technological imitation. We employ the model to assess the different strategies that laggard countries can adopt to catch up with leaders: market-friendly policies;industrial policies targeting the development of firms' capabilities and R&D investments, as well as trade restrictions for infant industry protection; protectionist policies focusing on tariffs only. We find that markets cannot do the magic: in absence of government interventions, laggards will continue to fall behind. On the contrary, industrial policies can successfully drive international convergence among leaders and laggards, while protectionism alone is not necessary to support catching up and countries get stuck in a sort of middle-income trap. Finally, in a global trade war, where developed economies impose retaliatory tariffs, both laggards and leaders are worse off and world productivity growth slows down.