Suchergebnisse

"Südafrika ist der einzige Vertreter Afrikas in der G-20-Gruppe. Dies verleiht dem Land einerseits einen herausgehobenen Status, aber andererseits entsteht daraus auch eine Reihe von Herausforderungen. Südafrika muss nun die richtige Einstellung zu ihrer Apartheidvergangenheit in der Region und zu ihrer wirtschaftlichen Dominanz auf dem Kontinent finden. Die Regierung zeigte sich sensibel für die Kritik aus anderen afrikanischen Staaten hinsichtlich dessen, was von einigen als Hegemoniebestrebungen auf dem Kontinent empfunden wird." (Autorenreferat)

In recent years sub-Saharan Africa, notwithstanding the global financial crisis, has increased its share in global trade and investment flows. This has led to an appreciable improvement in development levels, albeit off a small base. However, these patterns are still dominated by commodity flows and investment, and remain marginal on the global stage. Increased trade and investment flows, particularly related to network services, would be of great benefit to the sub-continent. Yet many domestic regulatory constraints remain. Furthermore, substantial international market distortions, particularly in agricultural trade, inhibit economic diversification into more value-adding activities. The Doha development round could, if concluded, go a long way towards addressing these barriers. Ultimately it could prove more consequential to the sub-continent's development trajectory than regional economic integration. The latter, whilst important, is shallow and too reliant on institution-intensive forms mimicking the European Union. Overall therefore this paper motivates for an African trade agenda focused on concluding the Doha round.

The India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) established in 2003 brings together three like-minded, democratic, market economies of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character, sharing a broadly similar economic, political and development situation. At the time of its formation IBSA was widely regarded as representing a novel form of South-South cooperation, transcending older models rooted in the logic of North-South confrontation in the post-colonial, Cold War world. However, now, as the respective countries prepare for their tenth anniversary summit in India, the forum seems to face a growing sense of irrelevance, perhaps even an existential crisis. There has been a proliferation of other forums-notably BRICS and the G20-which means that IBSA needs to differentiate itself if it is to endure. This paper suggests a common vision for IBSA, based on the concept of international liberalism, implying an open international market, well-regulated capital markets and tailored domestic policies such as social policy, health policy and education policy, may well increase the weight IBSA can gain in different international forums. Adapted from the source document.

In recent years sub-Saharan Africa, notwithstanding the global financial crisis, has increased its share in global trade and investment flows. This has led to an appreciable improvement in development levels, albeit off a small base. However, these patterns are still dominated by commodity flows and investment, and remain marginal on the global stage. Increased trade and investment flows, particularly related to network services, would be of great benefit to the sub-continent. Yet many domestic regulatory constraints remain. Furthermore, substantial international market distortions, particularly in agricultural trade, inhibit economic diversification into more value-adding activities. The Doha development round could, if concluded, go a long way towards addressing these barriers. Ultimately it could prove more consequential to the sub-continent's development trajectory than regional economic integration. The latter, whilst important, is shallow and too reliant on institution-intensive forms mimicking the European Union. Overall therefore this paper motivates for an African trade agenda focused on concluding the Doha round.

AbstractConcerns about socially uneven progress and inequality have regained public attention (including that of many populist politicians). The purpose of this paper is to identify the economic policies as well as economic factors that facilitate inclusive development. This paper is a first attempt to empirically estimate the drivers of inclusive development. For our empirical assessments, we apply the Multidimensional Inclusiveness Index suggested by Dörffel and Schuhmann (2022) in a panel OLS regression setup with fixed effects (FE) and GMM estimations for up to 178 countries and a time frame ranging from 1980 to 2018. In FE regressions, we find robust associations with inflation as well as financial sector development in the short and long-run, trade/GDP in the long-run. The GMM results point only to inflation and trade as significant drivers in the long-run and investment in the short run. These results suggest that accessible and well-functioning financial markets paired with low rates of inflation and high trade openness take on a more critical role than government spending. Our results suggest that rudiments of the Washington consensus could still guide the promotion of inclusive development.

Concerns about socially uneven progress and inequality have regained public attention (including that of many populist politicians). The purpose of this paper is to identify the economic policies as well as economic factors that facilitate inclusive development. This paper is a first attempt to empirically estimate the drivers of inclusive development. For our empirical assessments, we apply the Multidimensional Inclusiveness Index suggested by Dörffel and Schuhmann (2020) in a panel OLS regression setup with fixed effects (FE) and GMM estimations for up to 178 countries and a time frame ranging from 1980 to 2018. In FE regressions, we find robust associations with inflation as well as financial sector development in the short and long-run, trade/GDP in the long-run. The GMM results point only to inflation and trade as significant drivers in the long-run and investment in the short run. These results suggest that accessible and well-functioning financial markets paired with low rates of inflation and high trade openness take on a more critical role than government spending. Our results suggest that rudiments of the Washington consensus could still provide guidance for the promotion of inclusive development.

AbstractEconomic globalization has increasingly affected countries across the world, through participation in global value chains (GVCs) and helping to lift over one billion human beings out of extreme poverty since 1990. However, there are still too many people living in poverty, even in rich countries, and so concerns over exclusion of certain groups from the gains of economic globalization are rising internationally. Using the concept of inclusiveness based on Amartya Sen's capability approach, we find that G20 countries perform better than non-G20 countries. We then review how economic theory contributes to understanding the causes of (missing) inclusiveness by reviewing the literature pertaining to five drivers: growth, technology, structural change, trade, and political economy. Overall, domestic policies tailored to specific national circumstances are the main instruments for promoting inclusiveness. The danger is that in pursuing these domestic policies, states may undermine international arrangements constituting the liberal economic order. We argue that the liberal economic order generates insufficient global governance because there is always a fraction of countries opposing global policy coordination as they believe it harms them, and that this group of countries is increasing propelled by the surge of populism. This dynamic implies that global governance focus will increasingly shift to "coalitions of the willing", rendering multilateralism an increasingly challenging, and a la carte, proposition.

The countries comprising the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are currently not very integrated into global value chains (GVCs), potentially missing out on important development opportunities. Accordingly, we explore high level options for promoting their integration. Given East Asia's spectacular success with integrating into GVCs, we first assess the probability that SACU can copy their flying geese pattern. That was initiated by Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) investing in successive EastAsian countries thereby becoming the lead geese, to be joined subsequently by MNCs from other countries. We argue that the conditions for pursuing a flying geese approach are difficult to replicate in SACU. Therefore, we proffer and explore the proposition that South Africa could serve as the gateway for harnessing MNC geese flying from third countries into the SACU region, in time propelling regional development through knowledge and investment spillovers, and serving as a conduit into GVCs. However, there may be substantial obstacles to deepening this integration potential. Other African gateways are emerging as alternatives to South Africa. And some SACU governments would prefer to build regional value chains (RVCs) rather than prioritise GVC integration. We argue that RVCs are complements to GVCs. SACU countries, excluding South Africa, may not attract many world leading MNCs since their markets are small, but could attract smaller regional players from South Africa or elsewhere. Thus building RVCs in the short run could assist with integration into GVCs in the longer run. Overall, this requires harnessing South African and MNC geese to the South African gateway, in a mutually complementary strategy.

The countries comprising the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are currently not very integrated into global value chains (GVCs), potentially missing out on important development opportunities. Accordingly, we explore high level options for promoting their integration. Given East Asia's spectacular success with integrating into GVCs, we first assess the probability that SACU can copy their flying geese pattern. That was initiated by Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) investing in successive East Asian countries thereby becoming the lead geese, to be joined subsequently by MNCs from other countries. We argue that the conditions for pursuing a flying geese approach are difficult to replicate in SACU. Therefore, we proffer and explore the proposition that South Africa could serve as the gateway for harnessing MNC geese flying from third countries into the SACU region, in time propelling regional development through knowledge and investment spillovers, and serving as a conduit into GVCs. However, there may be substantial obstacles to deepening this integration potential. Other African gateways are emerging as alternatives to South Africa. And some SACU governments would prefer to build regional value chains (RVCs) rather than prioritize GVC integration. We argue that RVCs are complements to GVCs. SACU countries, excluding South Africa, may not attract many world leading MNCs since their markets are small, but could attract smaller regional players from South Africa or elsewhere. Thus building RVCs in the short run could assist with integration into GVCs in the longer run. Overall, this requires harnessing South African and MNC geese to the South African gateway, in a mutually complementary strategy.