In the Shifting Shadows of Crisis: Pivot Points, Crisis Attribution, and Macro-Economic Policies under Grand Coalition
In: German politics: Journal of the Association for the Study of German Politics, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 393-416
ISSN: 0964-4008
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In: German politics: Journal of the Association for the Study of German Politics, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 393-416
ISSN: 0964-4008
In: New political economy, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 597-608
ISSN: 1469-9923
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Heft 43, S. 19-25
ISSN: 2194-3621
"Handelt es sich bei der aktuellen Krise in der Euro-Zone um eine strukturelle Krise oder nur um eine Häufung von 'Krisenereignissen'? Noch ist unklar, wer letztlich die Gewinner sein werden - und wie diese die Krise darstellen werden." (Autorenreferat)
In: New political economy, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 597-609
ISSN: 1356-3467
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 286-306
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 286-306
ISSN: 1350-1763
In: West European politics, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 417-442
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: German politics, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 224-247
ISSN: 1743-8993
In: Germany, Europe and the politics of constraint, S. 201-229
"This chapter traces how rapidly evolving mechanisms of EU governance have affected German economic policy since the Treaty of Maastricht was agreed in 1991. Its central theme is the transition of Germany from 'pace-setter' in the constitutive politics of designing EMU to 'beleaguered player' in the regulative politics of its implementation, from Germany as policy model to Germany as the main problem. Europeanization has both reinforced traditional policy beliefs in 'sound' finance and acted as a catalyst for domestic policy reforms by strengthening the domestic discourse of competitiveness. It has also led to significant pressures for institutional reconfiguration, notably within the federal executive, federal-state relations, and the Bundesbank. The chapter questions the traditional assumption of a goodness of 'fit' between German and EU economic policies, in part because of unintended effects from EMU and in part because, despite emphasis on a consensus about the 'social market' economy, Germany lacks a unitary economic policy model. 'Ordo-liberal' and 'managed' economy elements co-exist in tension and react very differently to Europeanization. The nature of the domestic governing style, with its stress on consensus and the complementing of majoritarian by 'negotiation' democracy, creates an important institutional bias to 'managed' capitalism. But the reinforcing effects of the European Single Market, EMU, and globalization raise questions about the loyalty of key German firms to 'managed' capitalism and whether at some point its defences might be overwhelmed by a process of market liberalization that escapes its confines. In that case the polity and political effects of Europeanization will prove much greater than is currently seen." (author's abstract)
In: Europäische Integration, S. 449-478
In: Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint, S. 200-230
In: Public policy and administration: PPA, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 87-109
ISSN: 1749-4192
This article examines the complex effects - cognitive and material, direct and indirect - of the European Union on German economic policies, with particular reference to the government of Gerhard Schröder (1998-2002) and to Economic and Monetary Union. Particular attention is paid to the questions of institutional fit and misfit, of changing domestic opportunity structures, and of whether Europeanisation has been important in reshaping domestic preferences or in altering the context of domestic action. The changing context of domestic action raises in turn the question of whether Europeanisation is displacing the German model of 'managed' capitalism. Two variables are identified as central in answering this question: the nature of domestic governing style and the extent of commitment to 'negotiation' democracy over majoritarian democracy and the continuing loyalty of German firms to this model.
In: European States and the Euro, S. 173-211
In: European States and the Euro, S. 1-28