Suchergebnisse

Qu'est-ce qui explique la représentation géographique dans le personnel professionnel des organisations intergouvernementales (OI) ? Nous abordons cette question d'un point de vue organisationnel en considérant les processus de recrutement des OI. Dans le système des Nations unies (ONU), les processus de recrutement sont conçus pour garantir le mérite bureaucratique, l'expérience et la formation étant les critères de mérite pertinents. Nous développons et testons une théorie de l'offre, en postulant que les différences dans l'offre de candidats qualifiés et très expérimentés dans les pays peuvent expliquer la représentation géographique. En nous appuyant sur les données relatives au personnel de 34 OI et sur les données relatives à l'offre de 174 États membres, et en tenant compte de l'endogénéité et des autres explications, nous n'avons observé aucune relation de ce type pour la formation. Cependant, les pays qui disposent d'un grand nombre de candidats ayant une expérience professionnelle et régionale pertinente présentent des valeurs significativement plus élevées en termes de représentation. Ces résultats offrent une explication complémentaire sur les raisons pour lesquelles certains pays sont plus fortement représentés dans le personnel professionnel international que d'autres. Ils révèlent également la nature du mérite bureaucratique au sein de l'ONU, qui semble privilégier les connaissances locales et l'expérience professionnelle par rapport à l'éducation formelle (occidentale). Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Comment expliquer la représentation des États membres dans les organes du personnel des organisations du système des Nations unies ? Les travaux antérieurs ont montré que la puissance des États membres est un bon indicateur. Mais qu'en est-il du mérite bureaucratique ? L'article montre que les schémas de représentation peuvent également être expliqués en mesurant l'offre des États en termes de candidats possédant une expérience professionnelle et régionale pertinente. L'offre de candidats instruits ne joue aucun rôle significatif. Le mérite bureaucratique au sein de l'ONU semble mettre l'accent sur les connaissances locales et l'expérience professionnelle plutôt que sur l'éducation formelle (occidentale).

What explains geographical representation in the professional staff of intergovernmental organizations (IOs)? We address this question from an organizational perspective by considering IO recruitment processes. In the United Nations (UN) system, recruitment processes are designed to ensure bureaucratic merit, with experience and education being the relevant merit criteria. We develop and test a supply-side theory, postulating that differences in countries' supply of well-educated and highly experienced candidates can explain geographical representation. Drawing on staff data from 34 IOs and supply data from 174 member states, and controlling for endogeneity and alternative explanations, we find no such relationship for education. However, countries with a high supply of candidates with relevant working and regional experiences have significantly higher representation values. These findings offer a complementary narrative as to why some countries are more strongly represented in the international professional staff than others. Findings also unveil the nature of bureaucratic merit in the UN, which seems to emphasize local knowledge and working experience over formal (Western) education. Points for practitioners What explains member states' representation in the staff bodies of organizations in the UN system? Previous work has shown that member state power is a good predictor. But what about bureaucratic merit? The paper demonstrates that representation patterns can also be explained when measuring states' supply of candidates with relevant working and regional experience. Supply of educated candidates plays no significant role. Bureaucratic merit in the UN seems to emphasize local knowledge and working experience over formal (Western) education.

AbstractDespite a growing literature on the politics of evaluation in international organizations (IOs) and beyond, little is known about whether political or administrative stakeholders indeed realize ex-ante political interests through evaluations. This is, however, especially important considering the booming business of evaluation and the proliferation of institutional assessments both in domestic and international politics. We argue that formally independent IO evaluation units informally orientate towards either member states or the IO administration, depending on who controls the unit's budget, staff, and agenda resources. This should enable either actor to also use evaluation results along pre-defined strategic interests. Interview data gathered among evaluators, secretariat officials, and member state representatives of six IOs support the expected pattern, highlighting striking differences in the orientation of evaluation staff and evaluation use. Findings challenge the technocratic, apolitical image of evaluation, offering practical and theoretical implications for future research.

In the course of the so called 'refugee crisis' of 2015/16, the German administrative system for the implementation of migration and integration policy met its limits, but also showed a remarkable resilience in adapting to the crisis challenges. Starting from there, the authors of the book "Bessere Verwaltung in der Integrations- und Migrationspolitik" analyse what worked well and which aspects of the system still require innovation. The analysis is explicitly interdisciplinary, combining both a legal and a political analytical perspective. The well-structured book helps to understand the German administrative system of migration and integration policy which is highly complex due to the interrelatedness of different federal levels and policy areas. Recommendations for changes and reforms are discussed thoroughly and it becomes clear what kind of reforms are not only reasonable, but also feasible.

While the political nature of evaluation is widely recognized, few attempts exist to conceptualize and compare these politics. This article develops the concept of evaluation stakeholder influence potential, which builds on four political resources for influence (agenda-setting powers, staff and budgetary resources, access to evaluation results, and access to evaluators). These resources are measured for both member states and international public administrations in 24 United Nations organizations. We find that the administration—and not member states—have the largest influence potential in almost two-thirds of the international organizations. Our findings allow classifying them into three groups for which we expect differences in political contestation about evaluation use: two extreme-case groups (either member state or administrative dominance) and a group of contested middle cases. This finding of bureaucratic dominance reinforces literature on bureaucrats as powerful evaluation stakeholders in domestic settings and speaks to nascent research on bureaucratic influence in international organizations.

AbstractInternational organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve political disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to influence policy implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects the opportunities for such unilateral influence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three international organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding missions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states exert unilateral influence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo.

International organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve political disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to influence policy implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects the opportunities for such unilateral influence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three international organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding missions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states exert unilateral influence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo.

International organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve political disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to influence policy implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects the opportunities for such unilateral influence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three international organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding missions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states exert unilateral influence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo.

Eine Schlüsselfrage der Forschung zu internationalen Organisationen ist der Einfluss der internationalen Verwaltung auf die Fähigkeit der Mitgliedsstaaten, politische Einigungen herbeizuführen. Im Rahmen dieses Beitrages wird diese Fähigkeit verstanden als die Anzahl der von einer Organisation verabschiedeten (regulativen) politischen Entscheidungen und Erklärungen (Policy Output). Der Beitrag entwickelt ein Modell, das durch die Verknüpfung behavioristischer und strukturzentrischer Ansätze Hypothesen über die Fähigkeit zu politischer Einigung unterschiedlicher internationaler Organisationen generiert. Die Komplexität der Verhandlungssituation sowie der Ressourceneinsatz der internationalen Verwaltung werden als entscheidende unabhängige Einflussgrößen identifiziert und operationalisiert. Durch Messung dieser Variablen in einem Sample werden Hypothesen über die Fähigkeit zu politischer Einigung von sieben internationalen Organisationen generiert.