The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class
In: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 337/2017
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In: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 337/2017
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Working paper
Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their control. Based on this premise, we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default and menu rules supporting an effective choice of the takeover regime at the company level. For political economy reasons, we argue that different default rules should apply to newly public companies and companies that are already public when the new regime is introduced. Newly public companies should be governed by default rules that favor the interests of (minority) shareholders over those of management and controlling shareholders, because these are more efficient on average and easier to opt out of when they are or become inefficient for the particular company. Companies that are already public when the new regime is introduced should instead be governed by default rules matching the status quo, even if this favors the incumbents. This regulatory dualism strategy is intended to overcome the resistance of vested interests towards efficient regulatory change. Appropriate menu rules should be available to both groups of companies in order to ease opt-out of unfit defaults. Finally, we argue that European takeover law should be reshaped along these lines. Particularly, the board neutrality rule and the mandatory bid rule should become defaults that only individual companies, rather than member states, can opt out of The overhauled Takeover Directive should also include menu rules, for instance a poison pill defense and a time-based breakthrough rule. Existing companies would continue to be governed by the status quo until incumbents decide to opt into the new regime.
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Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their control. Based on this premise, we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default and menu rules supporting an effective choice of the takeover regime at the company level. For reasons of political economy bearing on the reform process, we argue that different default rules should apply to newly public companies and companies that are already public when the new regime is introduced. The first group should be governed by default rules crafted against the interest of management and of controlling shareholders, because these are more efficient on average and/or easier to opt out of when they are or become inefficient for the particular company. The second set of companies should instead be governed by default rules matching the status quo even if this favors the incumbents. This regulatory dualism strategy is intended to overcome the resistance of vested interests towards efficient regulatory change. Appropriate menu rules should be available to both groups of companies in order to ease opt-out of unfit defaults. Finally, we argue that European takeover law should be reshaped along these lines. Particularly, the board neutrality rule and the mandatory bid rule should become defaults that only individual companies, rather than member states, can opt out of. The overhauled Takeover Directive should also include menu rules, for instance a poison pill defense and a time-based breakthrough rule. Existing companies would continue to be governed by the status quo until incumbents decide to opt into the new regime.
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In: The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation
In: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 415/2014
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Working paper
Through empirical assessment of the role of the parliaments of the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, and Romania, this book addresses the theme of how engaged parliaments are and should be, in the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
In: Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2016
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In: This is the introductory chapter to a book entitled Principles of Financial Regulation, which will be published by Oxford University Press in 2016.
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This edition has been comprehensively revised and updated to reflect the profound changes in corporate law and governance practices that have taken place since the previous edition. These include numerous regulatory changes following the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the changing landscape of governance, especially in the US, with the ever more central role of institutional investors as (active) owners of corporations. The geographic scope of the coverage has been broadened to include an important emerging economy, Brazil. In addition, the book now incorporates analysis of the burgeoning use of corporate law to protect the interests of 'external constituencies' without any contractual relationship to a company, in an attempt to tackle broader social and economic problems
In: Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/2020
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Working paper
In: European Banking Institute Working Paper Series Forthcoming
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Working paper
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