Harmonization, heterogeneity and regulation: CESL, the lost opportunity for constructive harmonization
In: Common market law review, Band 50, Heft 1-2, S. 207-223
ISSN: 0165-0750
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In: Common market law review, Band 50, Heft 1-2, S. 207-223
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: HOOVER IP² Working Paper Series No. 13002
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Working paper
In: Common market law review, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 207-223
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: European review of contract law: ERCL, Band 9, Heft 4
ISSN: 1614-9939
In: Cato policy report: publ. bimonthly by the Cato Institute, Band 34, Heft 2
ISSN: 0743-605X
World Affairs Online
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 290-324
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractThe design of new constitutions is fraught with challenges on both issues of structural design and individual rights. As both a descriptive and normative matter it is exceedingly difficult to believe that one structural solution will fit all cases. The high variation in nation size, economic development, and ethnic division can easily tilt the balance for or against a Presidential or Parliamentary system, and even within these two broad classes the differences in constitutional structure are both large and hard to measure. The only confident claim is that some system of separation of powers coupled with checks and balances is needed. Deciding which system, however, is far harder. In contrast, that same level of doubt does not arise in connection with the correct specification of individual right. Strong systems of negative rights on matters of liberty, property, religion, and speech are preferable across a wide range of social organizations. On the other hand, any effort to create systems of positive entitlements will fail because of the negative effects that they have on wealth creation and the inability to define or limit the scope of the relevant entitlements.
In: U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 528
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Working paper
In: U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 506
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Working paper
In: Regulation, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 48-54
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In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 123-156
ISSN: 1471-6437
This article defends the classical liberal view of human interactions that gives strong protection to associational freedom except in cases that involve the use of force or fraud or the exercise of monopoly power. That conception is at war with the modern antidiscrimination or human rights laws that operate in competitive markets in such vital areas as employment and housing, with respect to matters of race, sex, age, and increasingly, disability. The article further argues that using the "human rights" label to boost the moral case for antidiscrimination laws gets matters exactly backwards, given that any program of forced association on one side of a status relationship (employer, not employee; landlord, not tenant) is inconsistent with any universal norm governing all individuals regardless of role in all associative arrangements. The articled also discusses the tensions that arise under current Supreme Court law, which protects associational freedom arising out of expressive activities (as in cases involving the NAACP or the Boy Scouts), but refuses to extend that protection to other forms of association, such as those involving persons with disabilities. The great vice of all these arrangements is that they cannot guarantee the stability of mandated win/lose relationships. The article further argues that a strong social consensus against discrimination is insufficient reason to coerce dissenters, given that holders of the dominant position can run their operations as they see fit even if others do otherwise. It closes with a short model human rights statute drafted in the classical liberal tradition that avoids the awkward line drawing and balancing that give rise to modern bureaucracies to enforce modern antidiscrimination laws.
In: Hoover digest: research and opinion on public policy, Heft 1, S. 27-29
ISSN: 1088-5161
In: Animal RightsCurrent Debates and New Directions, S. 143-158
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 286-313
ISSN: 1471-6437
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick seeks to demonstrate that
principles of justice in acquisition and transfer can be applied to justify
the minimal state, and no state greater than the minimal state. That approach
fails to acknowledge the critical role that forced exchanges play in
overcoming a range of public goods and coordination problems. These ends are
accomplished by taking property for which the owner is compensated in cash
or in kind in an amount that leaves him better off (by his own lights) than
before the transaction. Forced exchanges use coercion to form the state, but
the just compensation requirement guards against redistribution state imposed
redistribution for collateral purposes. Once these forced exchanges are
allowed to form a state, then they may be used thereafter to justify the
powers of taxation and eminent domain used to support infrastructure (roads,
sewers, public utilities) that neither the minimal state nor private markets
can supply.
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