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Poor countries are believed to be trapped in a vicious circle of poverty where low incomes lead to low savings and insufficient resources for investments. Foreign aid is supposed to boost investment and link poor countries to a virtuous circle of growth. But real per capita growth has not been present in the modern history of Kenya and Tanzania ‐ even though foreign aid has increased many times over. Does the recent history in Uganda pave the way for new principles of efficient aid, or is it just a rare occasion of aid‐induced behavioural change?

Cover page -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF FIGURES -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- The planning machine -- Bound capitalism -- The four horsemen of capitalist decline -- 2 WHEN CAPITALISM BECAME MIDDLE-AGED -- The bridges to Maddison counting -- How companies spend their money -- How companies play defense -- 3 THE COLOR OF CAPITALISM IS GRAY -- The color of capital is gray -- Prospecting for capitalists: meet the owners -- Sovereign wealth funds and the socialization of private companies -- Pensions and retirement savings -- Gray capital makes capitalism gray -- 4 THE RISE AND RISE AGAIN OF CORPORATE MANAGE RIALISM -- Innovation and corporate destruction -- The formula of failure -- Corporate managerialism: ideology on the rise -- The logic of planning -- Plan, plan, and plan -- Meet the sheriffs: gatekeepers against change -- 5 THE TWO FACES (AND PHASES ) OF GLOBALIZATION -- The globalist worldview -- The growth of globalization -- Scale to scope: from the first to the second generation of globalization -- Globalization has moved the boundaries between firm and market -- Globalization, specialization, and sunk costs -- 6 THE RETURN OF THE REGULATORS -- Regulation and political romanticism -- The time and money of regulation -- An era of deregulation and diffusion -- Deregulation and the reallocation of business -- After the deregulation wave -- Corporate funding, innovation, and regulation -- 7 KILLING FRONTIER INNOVATION -- The precautionary principle at work -- Conflicts between regulations -- Regulatory and policy uncertainties shape investment allocation -- Greening energy by complex regulations -- Complex regulation and economic growth -- 8 CAPITALISM AND ROBOTS -- The New Machine Age -- Companies, entrepreneurs, and complexity -- Capitalism and economic dynamism.

Timely, compelling, and certain to be controversial-a deeply researched study that reveals how companies and policy makers are hindering innovation-led growth Conventional wisdom holds that Western economies are on the threshold of fast-and-furious technological development. Fredrik Erixon and Bjorn Weigel refute this idea, bringing together a vast array of data and case studies to tell a very different story. With expertise spanning academia and the business world, Erixon and Weigel illustrate how innovation is being hampered by existing government regulations and corporate practices. Capitalism, they argue, has lost its mojo. Assessing the experiences of global companies, including Nokia, Uber, IBM, and Apple, the authors explore three key themes: declining economic dynamism in Western economies; growing corporate reluctance to contest markets and innovate; and excessive regulation limiting the diffusion of innovation. At a time of low growth, high unemployment, and increasing income inequality, innovation-led growth is more necessary than ever. This book unequivocally details the obstacles hindering our future prosperity.

Europe in emerging Asia : visions and divisions / Fredrik Erixon & Krishnan Srinivasan -- Europe and India : dialogue without intimacy / Krishnan Srinivasan -- Europe and South Asia : an enduring engagement / Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury -- Europe and Southeast Asia : the nature of contemporary relations / Evi Fitriani -- Thailand's middle income trap and Europe's assistance / Kriengsak Chareonwongsak -- Korea and Asia-Europe relations / Jin Park -- Britain, Europe and emerging Asia : a tale of opportunity and frustration / James Mayall -- Whither Asia-Europe trade relations and political cooperation? / Fredrik Erixon -- EU-China trade relations : the past, present and future / Zhang Xiaotong -- Why China-European relations are not so strategic : ten hypotheses / Wang Yiwei -- Central Europe, the European Union and emerging Asia / Agnieszka Kuszewska -- Europe's eastward expansion : the connotations for emerging Asia / Hari Vasudevan -- American bargaining, pivoting, and rebalancing : implications for Europe and emerging Asia / Philip I. Levy

Covid-19 and its broader implications have highlighted the importance of Europe's digital transformation to ensure Europeans' social and economic well-being. It provides important new learnings about Europe's quest for "technology sovereignty". While the debate about technology sovereignty is timely, the precise meaning of sovereignty or autonomy in the realm of technologies remains ambiguous. It should be noted that the political discussions about European technology sovereignty emerged far before the outbreak of the Coronavirus. The European Commission's recently updated industrial and digital policy strategies "institutionalised" different notions of sovereignty, reflecting perceptions that more EU action is needed to defend perceived European values and to secure Europe's industrial competitiveness. Often the political rhetoric reflected perceptions that Europe is losing global economic clout and geopolitical influence. It was said that dependency on technological solutions, often originating abroad, would require a European industrial and regulatory response. Against this background, the Corona crisis provides two important lessons for EU technology policymaking.

In den vergangenen Monaten wurden von einigen führenden Europapolitikern Strategien zur Erreichung einer sog. "europäischen Technologiesouveränität" gefordert. Die Fokussierung auf technologische und zuweilen auch "industrielle Souveränität" durch Politiker in Brüssel, Paris und anderen Hauptstädten ist vor allem als Reaktion auf die Verringerung des wirtschaftlichen Gewichts und des politischen Einflusses Europas in der Welt zu verstehen. Im Vergleich zu vielen Europapolitikern drückte Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel das politische Begehren nach Technologiesouveränität gleichwohl etwas differenzierter aus: "Wir müssen selbst entscheiden können, wo europäische Unabhängigkeit vonnöten ist." (Politico 2020a) Mit einem Anteil von beinahe 25 % an der Wirtschaftsleistung der EU hat Deutschlands Wirtschaft insgesamt viel zu gewinnen oder zu verlieren, was Strategien zur Erreichung einer europäischen Technologiesouveränität angeht. Deutschland hat den höchsten Anteil an wissensbasierter Beschäftigung und wissensbasiertem Handel in der EU. Das spiegelt den hohen Anteil der verarbeitenden Industrien wider, die in der deutschen Wirtschaft unter den patentintensiven - also technologieintensiven - Industrien vorherrschend sind. Der Zugang zu Spitzentechnologien der Zukunft ist für die deutsche Wirtschaft von entscheidender Bedeutung, da sämtliche Industrien einen Prozess hin zu technologiebasieren Produkten und Dienstleistungen durchlaufen, zu denen auch zukünftige Anwendungen der "Industrie der Dinge" (IoT) gehören.

After the failed merger of Alstom and Siemens - the two giants of Europe's railway manufacturing sector - the French and the German governments presented a manifesto with a set of radical proposals designed to reshape EU industrial and competition policy. In an article addressed to all European citizens, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, urged for reform of EU competition policy, to protect Europe from foreign competition[1]. MEP Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the European liberals, supports similar claims that Europeans cannot compete with Chinese or American firms[2]. One of the Franco-German suggestions would empower the European Council to veto European Commission decisions on competition policy. French and German Ministers argue that Europe's competitiveness in manufacturing is in decline. Somehow weakening EU competition policy, the manifesto claims, will strengthen Europe's competitiveness. This argument is wrong. To be competitive, European firms need more not less competition. Measures to promote market competition in Europe should be at the front and centre of any future industrial policy. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that market competition in Europe is not rising but declining.

In Europe's digital policy, digital managerialists, digital frontrunners, and digital convergers have emerged as coalitions among EU member states. This paper lays a focus on their stances on digital-policy reform and on their own understanding of the costs and benefits of the growth of the digital economy. The paper also suggests new ways for countries to cooperate in current or new constellations, which will allow them to profit from other countries' experiences, and to fully develop their own policy preferences as well as a clear understanding of appropriate digital reforms for them. Digitisation has the potential to support growth in many different sectors and the growing digital economy will make positive contributions to the productivity of non-ICT sectors as well. This is especially true for the services sector. However, countries with smaller digital endowments (e.g. digital infrastructure like networks) often believe that they do not stand to profit as much from digitisation as countries with bigger endowments. That is a profound misconception. Here, it is crucial to note that economic success in the digital economy is actually not merely the absolute level of digital endowments, but rather the way in which these endowments are effectively employed .

International trade is a powerful force of societal transformation. Trade agreements not only stimulated trade; they have improved the quality and integrity of domestic economic and political institutions. This view on trade as a force of institutional development and societal transformation has been reinforced in the recent decade when the routes to the world market for developing countries have been through global supply and value chains of multinational firms. In this paper, we examine whether the trade profile of fast-growing emerging economies reflects the broader theory that has underlined thinking about trade: when these countries grow, do they expand their import from developed countries in the direction of high value-added goods in order to get access to technology and knowledge that they cannot produce as efficiently at home? We find that the EU has seen strong growth in patent-intensive sector exports. Europe's aggregate trade performance with key emerging economies has confirmed the expectation about the composition trade between an advanced economy and an emerging economy. Accordingly, the EU has by a high degree of certainty been able to climb the value-added chain through trade with emerging economies. However, the pattern of trade is not always as expected, or predicted by theories of comparative advantage. Trade in the EU's major patent-intensive sectors - chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and motor vehicles - has generally evolved in a positive fashion in the period studied. However, recent years have witnessed a deterioration of EU exports in theses sectors. In many instances, these deteriorations are not the result of the EU's industrial mix. The under-performance in EU exports can be ascribed to local factors that artificially depress EU corporate competitiveness in those markets. In countries like Brazil, India and South Africa, these factors tend to be very strong and show a clear upward potential for the EU in improving the gains it can reap from trade in patent-intensive sectors. As a consequence, EU trade policy should focus on those sectors that show a strong potential export and import performance, but where other factors than economic competitiveness have caused trade under-performance in the past.

Investment in brands drives the allocation of resources in our economy. It increases competition, pushes firms to innovate, and decreases asymmetries in the market leading to a higher level of economic development. Investment in brands and intangibles has seen an increase in the last fifteen years, especially in advanced economies such as the EU and the US. The US is a pioneer when we talk about investment in brands, whereas the EU is still investing a higher share of GDP in tangible assets. Differences within the European Union are also significant. Size seems to matter. Larger economies usually invest less in brands, whereas relatively smaller economies invest more. Moreover, smaller economies tend to "spend" more on branding compared to bigger ones. However, on average, the economies taken in our sample (EU27 plus Norway and US) show that they correlate positively with investment in brands. The econometric results show a positive and significant correlation between investment in brands and GDP per capita. Nonetheless, each country's economic characteristics influence the role that brands play in the economy. Examples analysed in this policy brief are Germany and Sweden, where GDP per capita and investment in brands are negatively correlated, and Norway and the US, where correlation between the variables is rather positive.

Argentina's expropriation of Repsol's shares in the Argentinean energy company YPF sent chock waves through the international investment community. Even if the action by the government conformed to the standard of economic populism and nationalism that it is increasingly known for, the confiscatory nature of the expropriation was surprising. Subsequent actions by the government have also shown that it acted on ideological faith rather than taking a legitimate measure in the public interest. In contrast to the public case for the expropriation, the trade deficit in energy has continued to expand and the government has been forced to court international investors to team up with YPF to explore the rich shale reserves in Vaca Muerta. A second shock wave went through the international investment community when the government issued a decree to open up for international investments in the energy sector and allowed YPF to sign an agreement with Chevron to transfer some of the assets that are subject to the legal dispute between Repsol and Argentina. These actions change and reinforce the legal character of the expropriation - and it prompts governments to put more attention to improving the standards for international investment protection. The best approach now would be for the EU and the U.S. to negotiate a strong trade and investment accord that includes improved standards for investment protection. Other countries, especially those with a troubled record in investment disputes, may not be interested in revising their bilateral investment treaties with the EU and the U.S., but a transatlantic deal will change the politics of investment and incentivise other countries to agree to better standards.

Assessing Argentina's trade and investment policies, this Policy Brief discusses possible strategies for the European Union and the international community to respond to Argentina's turn to economic nationalism. The intention of the Argentinean government to strengthen national industries and stabilise its current accounts has led to irrational policies and irresponsible behaviour. Its manifest disrespect for international agreements and rules on trade and investment stretches from import restrictions and licencing schemes to impulsive nationalisation of companies. The European Union should not turn a blind eye to Argentina's misbehaviour. Indeed, the economic power relations might induce the EU to retaliate with protective measures targeting Argentinean exports. However, such a tit-for-tat approach is unlikely to incentivise Argentina to cease its provocative misconduct. Together with other major economies, the EU should instead use the legal and diplomatic tracks in order to defend the economic interests of its companies and industries. The EU should exhaust the legal mechanisms in the framework of the WTO and the ICSID and not retaliate against Argentina unless such measures have been sanctioned by international bodies beforehand. In parallel, diplomatic efforts should be intensified in order to reason with Argentina. Ultimately, it is up to Argentina whether or not it prefers to continue to act in violation of the international agreements that it has voluntarily ratified. Unless Argentina displays a greater interest in engaging in constructive dialogue and respect for the rules, there is no point in inviting it to meetings and work processes relating to international economic cooperation, such as the G20. Similarly, if Argentina continues to flaunt its obligations in the IMF, it should not remain as member.

This study examines the potential gains from a transatlantic zero-tariff agreement on trade in goods. The idea of deeper transatlantic economic integration has become more attractive in recent years. The hopes for an ambitious multilateral trade deal in the Doha Round negotiations have diminished; few countries appear ready to accept ambitious liberalisation on the global level. Leaders have increasingly turned to bilateral or regional trade initiatives, but few of them are capable of delivering sizeable gains to big economies like the European Union and the United States. (.)

The trade politics of EU–China commercial relations have sharply deteriorated in the last year. Obsessed by the EU's trade deficit with China, European leaders have become shrill and confrontational in their approach. China has contained its irritation over the EU's China‐bashing, but has slowed down its trade liberalisations. The EU and China must find a new way to contain protectionist threats in their trade and investment relations.

Few policy issues in Brussels and Washington DC are met with such a compact unity across political boundaries as the idea of deepened transatlantic economic integration. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the support for transatlantic economic co-operation remains strong. The election of Barack Obama as the new president of the United States has added new political appeal to the transatlantic agenda. Yet post cold-war initiatives to deepen transatlantic economic integration, and they have been many, have largely failed to achieve anything substantial. This paper discusses new approaches to transatlantic economic integration. It examines the trade benefits from a removal of tariffs and surveys different designs of a transatlantic trade deal.