Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy
In: International studies review, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 169-216
ISSN: 1521-9488
This essay examines the premise that coalition decision units can produce a variety of decision outcomes, despite fragmentation of political authority. It presents examples to illustrate each of the basic coalition configurations in decision rules: (1) a multiparty coalition cabinet that requires unanimous agreement, (2) interbureaucratic decisions requiring only a majority vote, & (3) a revolutionary coalition in an authoritarian regime with no decision rules. The authors begin with a theoretical overview of coalition decision units & foreign policy, & then proceed to a discussion of how decision rules shape policy. Examples include the Dutch government's decision regarding NATO deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe in the early 1980s; the Japanese government's handling of the 1971 exchange rate crisis; & the events surrounding the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis & seizure of the American Embassy. The authors conclude that a coalition of multiple autonomous actors is a dynamic process that can produce a wide range of outcomes. 1 Figure, 119 References. J. R. Callahan