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This article analyzes the potential for institutional design to depoliticize macroeconomic policy-making by examining currency board arrangements. It develops a novel argument to understand the effects of institutional design based on institutional complementarities. This argument highlights that the functioning of a given institution is conditioned by the broader institutional context. The article contrasts this framework with two common approaches – here termed the institutional design and the epiphenomenalism views – and argues that the centrality of institutional complementarities can account for the mixed record of currency boards. The most important complementarities of a currency board are with fiscal, labor market and informal institutions, which are important prerequisites for successful currency boards. By drawing on recent advances in the study of depoliticization, we show how these institutions contribute to governmental, societal and discursive depoliticization. This argument is evaluated by examining three case studies of currency boards – Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania. The article also explores some broader implications of this analysis for understanding the depoliticization of economic policy.

This article analyses currency boards from the perspective of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism. New institutionalism holds the view that institutions have independent, autonomous effects on the social world. Once established, institutions tend to become stronger over time due to path dependency. At the same time, the new institutionalist literature has been criticized for either ignoring or not being able to properly account for institutional change. This article pays attention to both self-enforcing and self-undermining effects generated by currency boards. Furthermore, the interaction of the currency board regime with other national institutions is analysed. After laying out the theoretical arguments, this article empirically assesses them with the analysis of three cases of currency board regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina. One of the findings is that currency boards tend to become more popular over time. This tendency can be explained by several self-enforcing effects related to growing indebtedness in foreign currencies, currency boards' role in ensuring macroeconomic stability as well as emerging ideational consensus supporting the regime. However, currency boards also unleash self-undermining tendencies, primarily related to the increasing general indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. The relationship of currency boards with the broader institutional set-up proved to be important. Unlike in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, the national institutional landscape in Argentina was unfavourable for the existence of the currency board regime. This was especially evident during the economic downturn of 1998–2002 when Argentina attempted to implement the internal adjustment strategy in order to safeguard the currency board. Nevertheless, Argentina's inability to quickly adopt a major fiscal consolidation package eventually led to the demise of the currency board regime. In turn, this inability can be attributed to the lack of informal norms of fiscal prudence, decentralized nature of Argentina's political institutions, and the organization of interest groups. The analysis provided in this article thus suggests that, despite important self-enforcing effects of currency boards, they are not sufficient to bring about the major transformation of a generally unfavourable national institutional landscape. ; Šiame straipsnyje valiutų valdybos modelis analizuojamas, remiantis naujojo institucionalizmo, o konkrečiau – istorinio institucionalizmo prieiga. Naujasis institucionalizmas laikosi požiūrio, kad institucijos turi autonomiš­ką, nepriklausomą poveikį. Dėl kelio priklausomybės reiškinio institucijos laikui bėgant turi tendenciją tapti stipresnės. Kita vertus, naujasis institucionalizmas susilaukė kritikos dėl to, kad sunkiai geba paaiškinti institucinę kaitą. Atsižvelgiant į šias diskusijas, straipsnyje aptariami tiek "save stipri­nantys", tiek "save silpninantys" valiutų valdybų poveikiai. Taip pat atkrei­piamas dėmesys į tai, kaip valiutų valdybos sąveikauja su kitomis naciona­linėmis institucijomis. Pristačius teorinius argumentus, nagrinėjami Estijos, Argentinos ir Lietuvos atvejai. Atskleidžiama, kad visais atvejais valiutų val­dybos režimo populiarumas ilgainiui stiprėjo, o išorės šokai tik sustiprindavo pastangas jį išlaikyti. Tai lėmė "save stiprinantys" poveikiai, didinę valiutų valdybos atsisakymo kainą: įsiskolinimas užsienio valiuta, makroekonomi­nio stabilumo ir pasitikėjimo užtikrinimo funkcija, priežastinių įsitikinimų dėl valiutų valdybos kaip geriausio monetarinio modelio įsitvirtinimas. Kita vertus, valiutų valdybos modelis visais atvejais sukūrė ir "save silpninan­čias" tendencijas, susijusias su didėjančiu bendru įsiskolinimu ir mažėjančiu konkurencingumu. Svarbu tai, kaip valiutų valdybos sąveikavo su bendra institucine sistema. Analizė atskleidžia, kad – skirtingai nei Lietuvoje ir ypač Estijoje – Argentinos bendra institucinė sistema buvo sunkiai suderinama su valiutų valdybos modeliu, ypač kriziniais laikotarpiais. Tai atsiskleidė per 1998–2002 metų ekonomikos krizę, kai Argentina nesugebėjo įgyvendinti vidinio prisitaikymo politikos, reikalingos išlaikyti valiutų valdybos modelį. Argentinai sutrukdė negebėjimas įgyvendinti greitą fiskalinę konsolidaciją, kuri savo ruožtu aiškintina didele politinės sistemos decentralizacija ir fiska­linės drausmės normos nebuvimu. Taigi atskleidžiama, kad, nors valiutų val­dybos kaip institucijos turi svarbių "save stiprinančių" tendencijų, vis dėlto šios tendencijos nėra pakankamos, kad iš esmės pakeistų bendrą nepalankų institucinį lauką.

This article analyses currency boards from the perspective of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism. New institutionalism holds the view that institutions have independent, autonomous effects on the social world. Once established, institutions tend to become stronger over time due to path dependency. At the same time, the new institutionalist literature has been criticized for either ignoring or not being able to properly account for institutional change. This article pays attention to both self-enforcing and self-undermining effects generated by currency boards. Furthermore, the interaction of the currency board regime with other national institutions is analysed. After laying out the theoretical arguments, this article empirically assesses them with the analysis of three cases of currency board regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina. One of the findings is that currency boards tend to become more popular over time. This tendency can be explained by several self-enforcing effects related to growing indebtedness in foreign currencies, currency boards' role in ensuring macroeconomic stability as well as emerging ideational consensus supporting the regime. However, currency boards also unleash self-undermining tendencies, primarily related to the increasing general indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. The relationship of currency boards with the broader institutional set-up proved to be important. Unlike in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, the national institutional landscape in Argentina was unfavourable for the existence of the currency board regime. This was especially evident during the economic downturn of 1998–2002 when Argentina attempted to implement the internal adjustment strategy in order to safeguard the currency board. Nevertheless, Argentina's inability to quickly adopt a major fiscal consolidation package eventually led to the demise of the currency board regime. In turn, this inability can be attributed to the lack of informal norms of fiscal prudence, decentralized nature of Argentina's political institutions, and the organization of interest groups. The analysis provided in this article thus suggests that, despite important self-enforcing effects of currency boards, they are not sufficient to bring about the major transformation of a generally unfavourable national institutional landscape.

This article analyses currency boards from the perspective of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism. New institutionalism holds the view that institutions have independent, autonomous effects on the social world. Once established, institutions tend to become stronger over time due to path dependency. At the same time, the new institutionalist literature has been criticized for either ignoring or not being able to properly account for institutional change. This article pays attention to both self-enforcing and self-undermining effects generated by currency boards. Furthermore, the interaction of the currency board regime with other national institutions is analysed. After laying out the theoretical arguments, this article empirically assesses them with the analysis of three cases of currency board regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina. One of the findings is that currency boards tend to become more popular over time. This tendency can be explained by several self-enforcing effects related to growing indebtedness in foreign currencies, currency boards' role in ensuring macroeconomic stability as well as emerging ideational consensus supporting the regime. However, currency boards also unleash self-undermining tendencies, primarily related to the increasing general indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. The relationship of currency boards with the broader institutional set-up proved to be important. Unlike in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, the national institutional landscape in Argentina was unfavourable for the existence of the currency board regime. This was especially evident during the economic downturn of 1998–2002 when Argentina attempted to implement the internal adjustment strategy in order to safeguard the currency board. Nevertheless, Argentina's inability to quickly adopt a major fiscal consolidation package eventually led to the demise of the currency board regime. In turn, this inability can be attributed to the lack of informal norms of fiscal prudence, decentralized nature of Argentina's political institutions, and the organization of interest groups. The analysis provided in this article thus suggests that, despite important self-enforcing effects of currency boards, they are not sufficient to bring about the major transformation of a generally unfavourable national institutional landscape.

This article analyzes business power in the context of noisy politics by comparing business involvement in the two British referendum campaigns about membership in the European Community in 1975 and the Brexit referendum about European Union membership in 2016. By exploring these two contexts, the paper seeks to identify the conditions under which business elites can and cannot be effective in conditions of noisy politics. We identify three key factors; the incentives to get directly involved during times of noisy politics, the legitimacy of business involvement, and finally the capacity to act in a cohesive way as determinants of business influence during periods of noisy politics. We argue that these factors have changed substantially over the last four decades due to wider changes in the nature of capitalism, and we discuss their impact on business power in the UK and more widely.

ABSTRACTIn recent years Europe has become a primary focus for Chinese investment. In the context of the rolling out of Chinese government plans such as its Belt and Road Initiative and 'Made in China 2025' industrial strategy, and the fact that many Chinese companies are either controlled or influenced by the Communist Party, major consequences for Europe's economic development — and its social, political and geopolitical corollaries — are now in train. The analyses presented in this special issue significantly advance our understanding of the dynamics and consequences of China's deepening economic engagements in Europe. They do so particularly in relation to the contentious issues surrounding corporate acquisitions by Chinese companies, the security problems associated with some investments and the impact of China's investment finance. This introductory article offers an institutional framework for comprehending the other articles that constitute the special issue and provides summaries of their contents. Additionally, it provides an assessment of how the special issue's contribution advances our understanding of China's externalization and its implications for European economic development.