Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this note is to contribute to the analysis of various sorts of institutions for distributing goods to members of a society. The paper examines what happens when a society is faced with distributing ordinary private goods to its members. It can utilize three different sorts of institutions: a voting system, a price system, or a fixed proportions sharing rule. We suggest that a fixed proportions sharing rule generally will be found preferable by the society to majority rule. We argue that Shubik's assertion that a price system will dominate majority rule is not true without qualification.

Introduction. - 1. The Twenty-First-Century Wars Without Citizen Armies. - 2. War and Democracy in Classical Athens. - 3. The Glory That was Rome. - 4. A Millennium of Landed Aristocracy. - 5. The Emergence of Monarchy in France and Spain. - 6. War and Representation in England, the Netherlands, and Sweden. - 7. Italian Republics. - 8. Eastern Lands in Early Modern Europe. - 9. Mountain Republics. - 10. The Nine-teenth-Century Pivot. - 11. Twentieth-Centuty Wars of Full Mobilization. - 12. War, Racism, and Civil Rights in the United States. - Conclusions

Classical republican theories are monadic in the sense of seeing in each political regime a set of typical operating characteristics. There is disagreement as to what those characteristics are and specifically whether republican governments are more likely to be aggressive or peace loving. We group these two views as (democratic) mobilization theory versus (republican) checks theory and argue, first, that each can help us understand the finer structure of republican government; second, that they are not contradictory but can be combined in various ways in the same institutions; and third, that they offer the prospect of deepening our understanding of what is called the democratic peace proposition.