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Scholars and international organizations engaged in institutional reconstruction converge in recognizing political corruption as a cause or a consequence of conflicts. Anticorruption is thus generally considered a centerpiece of institutional reconstruction programs. A common approach to anticorruption within this context aims primarily to counter the negative political, social, and economic effects of political corruption, or implement legal anticorruption standards and punitive measures. We offer a normative critical discussion of this approach particularly when it is initiated and sustained by external entities. We recast the focus from an outward to an inward perspective on institutional action and failure centered on the institutional interactions between officeholders. In so doing, we offer the normative tools to reconceptualize anticorruption in terms of an institutional ethics of "office accountability" that draws on an institution's internal resources of self-correction as per the officeholders' interrelated work

Scholars and international organizations engaged in institutional reconstruction converge in recognizing political corruption as a cause or a consequence of conflicts. Anticorruption is thus generally considered a centrepiece of institutional reconstruction programmes. A common approach to anticorruption within this context aims primarily to counter the negative political, social, and economic effects of political corruption, or implement legal anticorruption standards and punitive measures. We offer a normative critical discussion of this approach, particularly when it is initiated and sustained by external entities. We recast the focus from an outward to an inward perspective on institutional action and failure centred on the institutional interactions between officeholders. In so doing, we offer the normative tools to reconceptualize anticorruption in terms of an institutional ethics of 'office accountability' that draws on an institution's internal resources of self-correction as per the officeholders' interrelated work.

Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience.

AbstractIn the European Union, for the first time, lay people can participate directly in the procedure of assessment of GMO (genetically modified organisms) products, an exercise normally reserved for scientists and legal experts. What makes this a unique strategy of participation is that for each single application for authorization, lay people have the opportunity to express their views. This article presents the result of the first in‐depth analysis of this type of Internet participatory exercise in the first years of its implementation. It shows that, despite generally participatory technology assessment aims at deliberative consensus on technical questions, this forum is instead a way to expose the work of regulative authorities to public scrutiny and to express dissent and opposition to the European Commission policy on GMOs.

This article argues that citizens are responsible for the way they participate in political communication and debate, including for the quality of the pieces of information they post or disseminate on social media. This view contrasts with approaches that prioritise institutional responsibility in combating misleading information. Instead, in the article's perspective, public and private institutional interventions are justified only when they aim at sustaining citizens in upholding their epistemic duties and contribute to an environment that facilitates responsible communicative exchanges.

In the European Union, the institutional reform that risk regulation system has undergone in the last decade has emphasised the need for fostering public participation and stakeholder involvement in decision making processes. Citizen scrutiny, in theory, ought to bring about better governance, and greater participation in public policy decisions is usually regarded as a symptom of a healthy democracy. By presenting evidence from two case studies in the field of bio-technology regulation, this paper aims to prove that taking participation as a tout court advantage is a mistake.