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AbstractLanguage rights represent claims of entitlement not only on behalf of individuals, but also on behalf of linguistic communities. As such, they raise deep questions of identity and affinity for Canadians. This study, the first report of the Charter Project, investigates mass and elite attitudes toward language rights in Canada. Beginning with the problem of double standards—whether anglophones and francophones want to affirm certain rights for their own group but not for the other—this study finds that attitudes toward language rights are shaped by an interplay between core values to which citizens subscribe and their concern for the status of the groups, both linguistic and partisan, with which they identify.

Language rights in Canada are examined through analysis of a Charter Project survey of the general population (N = 1,250) & decisionmakers (N = 936), or elites, concerning the rights of Canadian citizens & linguistic communities. Bilingualism was found to be overwhelmingly supported by both English- & French-speaking Canadians through direct questioning; however, use of a substitution technique produced different results: (1) both the general population & elite francophones were found to support the language rights of both francophones outside Quebec & anglophones living in Quebec; & (2) anglophones were found to support the language rights of anglophones inside Quebec, but were significantly less supportive of the rights of francophones outside of Quebec. Discussion of the double standard is offered from several perspectives: (A) bilingualism & underlying values; & (B) the symmetry & asymmetry of anglophone & francophone tolerance, mobility rights, & commitment to bilingualism. Conclusions regarding the importance of strategic calculations of group status & core political values for a political theory of rights are offered. 11 Tables, 1 Appendix. D. Generoli

Two questions have dominated the modern study of politics. How do
political systems become democratic? And how, supposing they have managed to become democratic, do they manage to remain so? As yet, there is no agreement on the answer to the first question. For a generation, however, there has been consensus on a core part of the answer to the second. In democratic polities, political elites have come to consensus in support of democratic rights, and in times of political stress
this elite consensus has served as a bulwark protecting citizens' liberties.

Richard Vengroff & F. L. Morton's (2000) criticism of Sniderman et al's The Clash of Rights (New Haven: Yale U Press, 1996) is rebutted, arguing that their contention that the study's data, if correctly analyzed, bolster rather than undercut the theory of democratic elitism is incorrect. The basic premises of the theory of democratic elitism are outlined, & three claims of Vengroff & Morton's critique are addressed in particular: (1) Regions of Canada differ in political culture. (2) There is greater variation in views on matters of rights among the general public than among political elites. (3) Cleavages over issues of rights attributed to the role of the party system should, instead, be attributed to the impact of region. An explanation is offered for the study's apparent anomaly of political elites converging on some democratic rights while diverging on others, in particular, (a) why some political elites form a protective, cross-party consensus in support of essential liberties on some issues but not others & (b) how issues of democratic rights on which partisan elites form a consensus across party lines differ from those in which they do not. 4 Tables. Z. Dubiel

Cette communication documente l'existence de niveaux d'antisémitisme et d'ethnocentrisme systématiquement plus élevés au Québec qu'ailleurs au Canada, puis examine les facteurs socioculturels, psychologiques et politiques qui sous‐tendent ce phénomène. L'analyse des données de l'Enquěte sur la Charte des droits et libertés révèle que les facteurs socioculturels jouent le rǒle prépondérant. Plus particulièrement, la plus forte propension des Québécois à voir les Juifs d'un oeil défavorable est en grande partie attribuable à une plus grande valorisation de la conformité dans la culture québécoise. Ainsi, les Québécois diffèrent des autres canadiens non pas tant parce qu'ils souscrivent à tout l'éventail des préjugés antisémites, mais parce qu'ils acceptent les caractérisations négatives des Juifs sans se poser des questions. D'après les auteurs, l'antisémitisme au Québec ne s'explique ni par le nationalisme politique ni par des traits de personalité. La communication traite également de diverses questions concernant la méthodologie à employer pour mesurer l'antisémitisme.Documenting consistently higher levels of anti‐Semitism and ethnocentrism in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada, this article investigates the sources of this prejudice in socio‐cultural, psychological and political factors. Analysis of survey data from the Charter of Rights Study show that socio‐cultural factors are most important. In particular, the greater readiness of Quebeckers to look unfavourably on Jews is largely a consequence of the high value placed upon conformity in Quebec culture. Quebeckers therefore differ from other Canadians not primarily in a willingness to subscribe to a full syndrome of anti‐Semitic sentiments, but in casually accepting negative characterizations of Jews. Anti‐Semitism in Quebec is found not to be related to nationalist political sentiments, nor is it substantially personality‐driven. A variety of methodological issues pertaining to the measurement of anti‐Semitism are also discussed.

Since the seminal studies of Stouffer and McClosky it has become accepted that political elites are markedly more committed to civil liberties and democratic values than is the public at large; so much so that political elites should be recognized, in McClosky's words, as 'the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the Creed'. The argument of this article is that previous analyses have erred by focusing on the contrast between elites taken as a whole and the mass public. The crucial contrast is not between elites and citizens, but rather between groups of elites that are competing one with another for political power.Drawing on large-scale surveys of two modern democracies, Canada and the United States, this article demonstrates that differences among elites in support for civil liberties eclipse, both in size and political significance, differences between elites and citizens. The fallacy of democratic elitism, as this study shows, is its indifference to which elites prevail in the electoral competition for power.

Contrary to popular myth, Britain does have a constitution, one that is uncodified and commanded little political interest for most of the twentieth century. In the late 1990s, Tony Blair's New Labour Government launched a program of reform that was striking in its ambition. Reinventing Britain tells the story of Britain's constitutional reform and weighs its long-term significance, with essays both by officials who worked on the reforms and by other leading commentators and academics from Britain and North America.Contributors: Mark Bevir, Jack Citrin, Joseph Fletcher, Robert Hazell, Ailsa Henderson, Kate Malleson, Craig Parsons, Kenneth MacKenzie, Peter Riddell