Remittances, transaction costs, and informality
In: Journal of development economics, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 356-366
ISSN: 0304-3878
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 356-366
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of development economics, Band 87, Heft 2, S. 309-321
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of international economics, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 171-189
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Journal of international economics, Band 138, S. 103646
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 19-2
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9024
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Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 124, S. 41-59
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 97, Heft 2, S. 387-395
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: NBER Working Paper No. w11823
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In: Comparative economic studies, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 149-160
ISSN: 1478-3320
In: World Development Report 2020
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 124, S. 41-59
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
Whether demands for bribes for particular government services are associated with expedited or delayed policy implementation underlies debates around the role of corruption in private sector development. The "grease the wheels" hypothesis, which contends that bribes act as speed money, implies three testable predictions. First, on average, bribe requests should be negatively correlated with wait times. Second, this relationship should vary across firms, with those with the highest opportunity cost of waiting being more likely to pay and facing shorter delays. Third, the role of grease should vary across countries, with benefits larger where regulatory burdens are greatest. The data are inconsistent with all three predictions. According to the preferred specifications, ceteris paribus, firms confronted with demands for bribes take approximately 1.5 times longer to get a construction permit, operating license, or electrical connection than firms that did not have to pay bribes and, respectively, 1.2 and 1.4 times longer to clear customs when exporting and importing. The results are robust to controlling for firm fixed effects and at odds with the notion that corruption enhances efficiency.
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6810
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9173
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