Suchergebnisse

Mientras el programa costarricense de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PPSA) ha sido tradicionalmente presentado como un mecanismo basado sobre el mercado, se ha demostrado últimamente que el programa, a menos en la forma que se ejecuta, se aparta mucho de este ideal. Este estudio pretende profundizar la comprensión del tipo de arreglo institucional que constituye el PPSA, a través del análisis del principio de justicia subyacente al programa y de su gobernanza. A partir de las matrices de análisis de Pascual et al. (2010) y de Wunder (2005), el análisis de la concepción de justicia subyacente al programa muestra que la visión del programa no se puede considerar "neoliberal", al no estar basada sobre una lógica utilitaria pero más bien de "gratificación por servicios ambientales. La aplicación de la matriz conceptual de Vatn (2010) permite identificar que tres tipos de estructuras de gobernanza - jerarquía, mercado y gestión comunitaria - son combinados para que el PPSA funcione. Permite diferenciar el PPSA del modelo "coasiano" que pone énfasis únicamente sobre su supuesta lógica de mercado. La duración de esta visión del PPSA como un mecanismo de mercado se explica por parte por preferencias ideológicas sostenidas por estructuras de poder.

At both the international and national scale, since the 1990s, the international environmental community has been increasingly interested in market-based instruments (MBIs) as mechanisms for the provision of ecosystem services (OECD, 1993, 1995, 1997). In the biodiversity sector, "biodiversity offsets" (BOs) rapidly become one of the indispensible policy solutions in the response to the challenges of maintaining biodiversity. International organizations and conventions, think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even private enterprises have incorporated the concept and promoted offset based instruments on a supranational scale. Today, BOs are an increasingly popular yet controversial tool in conservation even if biodiversity offset schemes are very diverse and heterogeneous. Their popularity lies in their potential to meet the objectives of biodiversity conservation and economic development in tandem; the controversy lies in the need to accept ecological losses in return for uncertain gains (Bull et al., 2013, 1). To understand the success of BOs schemes, the communication analyses, first, the success of BOs in global biodiversity arenas since the beginning of the 2000's and the policy entrepreneurs who introduced BO approach. Second, we discuss the multiple uses of BOs and their diverse institutional arrangements. Finally, we also propose an institutional framework that deals with challenges in the offset process in order to analyse opportunities and risks of BOs. (Texte intégral)

Based on a review of the literature and on interviews of different local stakeholders, this paper assesses the efficiency of the Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) as a conservation tool focusing on its main modality: the forest protection one. The PESP has had a low direct impact on the forest cover of the country but may have had an important indirect impact as it served as compensation for the prohibition of forested land uses change. Furthermore, the PESP appears to have a better impact at a lower cost than the protected area network, the main alternative as a conservation tool. The PESP appeared also quite competitive from the point of view of its costs before the institutional transformation that occurs in 2008. A significant potential for improvement of the PESP efficiency exists on the short term but may affect its legitimacy and impact the social norms and values dealing with conservation in a way that could jeopardize the program effects on the long term.

This article assesses, from an institutional point of view, the performance of the Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) as a conservation tool focusing on its main modality: the forest protection. The PESP has had a low direct impact on the forest cover of the country but may have had an important indirect impact as it served as compensation for the prohibition of forested land uses change. This program appeared also quite competitive from the point of view of its costs before the institutional transformation that occurred in 2008. The PESP has also proved to be a very effective fundraising tool, but it has failed in the development of strong synergies with other institutions for forest protection and it has not supported the development of sustainable forest management. From a cosean perspective, a significant potential for improvement of the PESP cost-effectiveness exists on the short term through changes in the program's rules. However, these changes often deny the program's institutional nature and could jeopardize the program effects on the long term. A safer way to improve the PESP performance is to focus on strengthening its management and governance.

This communication aims at discussing the interest of Sociology and Policy Science to answer research questions on the institutional economics research agenda on Ecosystem Services concept and on one of its tools: Payment for Environmental Services (PES). Through case studies at international level and in different countries (Costa Rica and Madagascar), we argue that policy transfer studies (PTS), Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Path Dependency Framework (PDF) and Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) could provide a signif icant insight to understand PES program diffusion worldwide, form and characteristics of PES functioning in developing countries.

program to be developed using the notion of PES. The PESP has been analyzed as a very promising innovating instrument for conservation purpose and has been considered a reference model for PES development. As such, many scholars analyzed the PESP and have discussed its efficiency. Nevertheless, the genesis and the evolution of the Program has been poorly documented from a learning process and stakeholders perspectives In this working paper, we propose to analyze the genesis and evolution the PESP interpreting the continuity and inflexions it has experimented related to stakeholders' learning process and evolution of their balance of power. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orientate the objectives and the functioning of the PESP towards their interests and vision. We finally argue that PESP is not a mere market based instrument driven by a market coordination but an instrument driven by complex multi-stakeholder governance depending on the stakeholders' learning process and balance of power.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.

International audience ; The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) was a pioneer programme to be developed using the notion of Environmental Services (ES). The PESP has been analysed as a very promising and innovating instrument for conservation purposes. As such, many scholars analysed the PESP and discussed its efficiency and its effects on poverty alleviation. In this chapter, we adopt an institutional framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of the PESP underlying the role of stakeholders. We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are interacting to orient the objectives and functioning of the PESP towards their vision and interests. Indeed, the main decisions regarding the programme's features reflect the state and evolution of forest stakeholders' power balance and their learning process.