Suchergebnisse

Toward the end of the second Viet Nam war, the American Army exhibited indications of widespread disintegration. Explaining these indicators requires cross comparisons of culturally similar military systems. 2 principal military systems are compared to the US Army in Viet Nam: the cohesiveness of the Germany Army in WWII, & the French experience in the first Indo-China War. Where the cohesion of the German Army was related to primary group cohesion under great stress combined with a respected & self-sacrificing leadership, the same ambience functioning in the French Expeditionary Force of 1947-1954, greatly different conditions operated in the US Army in Viet Nam, expressed as aggregate indicators of disintegration. For all the forces, social or ideological conflict in the society at large was not significantly linked to conditions in the military. This was true with respect to the US Army, 1961 through 1972, & particularly after 1968. Indicators of military disintegration such as desertion, assassination of leaders, drug usage, & mutiny appeared & accelerated toward the last years of the war under a situation of relatively minimal combat stress. Simultaneously involved were 3 intervening factors: (1) large numbers of officers of lowered quality & a senior leadership which absented itself from battle, (2) managerial careerism instead of concern with traditional 'honor', & (3) an absence of primary group cohesion. Available survey data support the managerial disposition of the officer corps. In a military self-study of junior & senior Army leadership, attitudes of self- interest, disloyalty to subordinates, & personal priorities stressing career instead of a sense of mission in the traditional 'military way' predominated. The divisive & fragmented state of the Army was largely self- inflicted. 10 Tables. Modified AA.