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Before China's accession to the WTO, many observers predicted that the inclusion of the emerging trade power will change the pre-existing power structure in the multilateral trading system. Some even went as far as suggesting that China will become the leader of developing countries in the crusade against developed countries, which have dominated the organization during most of the history of the GATT/WTO. Now that China has been in the WTO for almost nine years, has it really emerged as the leader of developing countries as predicted? In this short essay, I will argue that while China has seen itself transformed from a ruletaker to a rule-shaker and possibly even a rule-maker in the most powerful international organization in the world, its ascent has not followed nicely the path that has been sketched out by commentators. To the contrary, the ways China participated in different activities in the trading system has come rather as a surprise to many observers. It is important that we correctly understand the contours of China's progress so far, as this will definitely bear upon how it will help shape the multilateral trading system in the future.

On 29 June 2003, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (the Mainland) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). As the first Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) for both sides, the CEPA provides a model for China to use the arrangements allowed under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to further trade liberalisation and promote economic development. This is a commendable endeavour. However, due to the complexity of the relevant rules of the WTO, caution must be exercised in the formulation and implementation of such agreements. This article briefly discusses the requirements under the WTO rules and how to comply with them.

Since 2017, the US has blocked appointments to the WTO Appellate Body (AB), citing various concerns over its judicial approach, with the most significant being the issue of judicial overreach. This article provides a critical analysis of this issue and makes important contributions to the ongoing debate. Drawing on the fundamental function of the WTO, it offers a fresh approach to assess judicial overreach and shows that AB rulings in major non-trade remedy cases (that have consistently concerned the US) have served that function and hence should not be treated as 'overreaching'. We argue that, the allegation of judicial overreach, while untenable, does reflect systemic concerns with the legislative failure of the WTO Members to provide effective checks against the judicial power. This will need to be addressed, or else it will continue to haunt the AB or any other adjudicative body that takes over its role. We propose several fresh solutions to restore a proper balance between the legislative and judicial functions of the WTO, before concluding that as a Member-driven organization, the success or failure of the WTO ultimately depends on its Members.