Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn his Scroogenomics, Joel Waldfogel argues that gifting creates enormous deadweight loss, as individuals give one another gifts that they do not want or cannot use. He views efficiency as static, calculating the gains from trade (or gifting) at the moment of transaction. A puzzle arises, however, when one realizes that gifting has been a nearly ubiquitous institution throughout history. If gifting wastes valuable resources, why does it persist? We argue that gift giving is dynamically efficient despite the possibility of generating short-term deadweight loss. A well-functioning market economy requires expanded social networks and trustworthiness among anonymous and quasi-anonymous exchange partners. Gifting allows individuals to signal trustworthiness by offering 'burnt sacrifices'. Gifting practices that include a willingness to sacrifice via reciprocity norms, public visibility and ritual will tend to promote generalized trust. We consider these four elements – sacrifice, reciprocity, publicness, and ritual – to be critical institutional design principles for fostering dynamic efficiency. Our essay contributes to the literature on institutional economics by prompting scholars to think about the long-term (dynamic) efficiencies generated by cultural practices that appear inexplicably inefficient.

Presently, Islam in Europe has a weak and divided political voice. This article draws on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities. The authors develop general theoretical propositions and apply them to a case study of mosque – state relations in the federal state ( land) of Berlin. The study shows that institutional features of the German polity and diaspora Islam make collective action difficult and provide opportunities for factions ("spoilers") to under-mine broad-based collective action if they perceive centralizing organizations as compromising doctrinal and organizational autonomy. In addition, conflicts between organizations representing conservative Muslim interests and secularly oriented ones further complicate collective action. The result is narrow interest articulation by smaller, less diverse groups. Based on our study, the authors consider the general applicability of our propositions and their implications for European polities.