Suchergebnisse

Until 1975, Washington paid little attention to southern Africa, a backwater in the Cold War where weak insurgencies posed little threat to white rule in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia. The collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974 meant the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique. The Cuban victory in Angola the following year propelled southern Africa into the vortex of the Cold War. Between 1977 and 1981, the Carter administration engaged in a complicated minuet with South Africa and the Namibian rebels to craft a negotiated settlement that would grant Namibia its independence. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski clashed over the course the United States should follow, while Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly supported the Namibian insurgents and 20,000 Cuban soldiers were poised in neighboring Angola. I analyze the failure of Carter's Namibia policy based on US, Cuban and South African documents, as well as interviews with Namibian, US, Cuban and South African protagonists. Adapted from the source document.

This article explores the role that Cuba played in Africa after its dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola in late 1975 and the first few months of 1976. The article focuses on the two most important aspects of Cuba's policy in Africa after 1976: its intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–1978; and its continuing presence in Angola, a presence that continued until 1991. The article analyzes Cuba's motivations, the extent to which Fidel Castro's policy was a function of Soviet demands, and the effect of Cuba's policy in Africa on relations with the United States. The concluding section offers an assessment of the costs and benefits of Cuba's policy.

Drawing on thousands of pages of documents from the closed Cuban archives, from U.S. archives, and from the former East German archives, as well as published materials, this article explores the role that Cuba played in Africa after its dramatic dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola in late 1975 and the first few months of 1976. The article focuses on the two most important aspects of Cuba's policy in Africa after 1976: its intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–1978 and its continuing presence in Angola, a presence that continued until 1991. The article analyzes Cuba's motivations, the extent to which Fidel Castro's policy was a function of Soviet demands, and the effect of Cuba's policy in Africa on relations with the United States. The concluding section offers an assessment of the costs and benefits of Cuba's policy in Africa.