Suchergebnisse

We inventory more than 150 studies of distributive politics in more than three dozen countries other than the United States. We organize existing studies under two theories: theories of democratic accountability and theories of government responsiveness. Studies that concern democratic accountability conceptualize distributive allocations as attempts by politicians to protect themselves electorally by targeting specific groups of voters. We identify four subsets: (a) studies of whether politicians target goods to core or swing voters; (b) studies of general political favoritism in targeting government goods; (c) studies of whether goods are disbursed according to the electoral cycle; and (d) studies of whether elected officials gain votes from the disbursement of government goods. We illustrate each with examples from the literature. We then discuss distributive politics as responsiveness to the median voter. This perspective entails a focus on the redistributive consequences of government policy and investigates whether special interests capture a disproportionate share of goods coming from government. To illustrate the utility of both perspectives, we analyze original data on electricity provision in India's largest state. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country's 92 provinces between 1953 and 1994. Extending implications of theories of legislative behavior to the context of open‐list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts and whether opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that when districts elect politically more powerful deputies from the governing parties, they receive more investments. We interpret this as indicating that legislators with political resources reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, are not able to discipline their own members of parliament sufficiently to target the parties' areas of core electoral strength. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operates to steer resources to areas when the main opposition party gains more votes.

We study the determinants of wage inequality in 16 OECD countries in the last two decades of the twentieth century. We find that these are quite different in the 1980s than in the 1990s. In the 1980s, growing wage dispersion is due to changes in the institutions of the labor market. Declining unionization and declines in the level at which wages are bargained collectively both contribute to widening pay dispersion in the 1980s. In the 1990s, by contrast, increases in pay inequality are due to increasing trade with less developed nations. To the extent that low-pay workers have been protected from rising wage differentials in the 1990s, it has been because of government policy, in the form of social insurance, and not thanks to labor organizations. This is the first study to report that the causes for pay inequality differed between the 1980s and the 1990s.

Standard crossnational measures of corruption draw on information collected through surveys. We propose a novel alternative measure based on objective data, namely, the difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and a measure of the value of public capital stocks. Where the difference between the value of existing infrastructure and the actual physical infrastructure is larger, more money is being siphoned off in mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement; that is, corruption is greater. We create this measure for Italy's 20 regions as of the mid-1990s, controlling for possible regional differences in the costs of public construction. We analyze data over the Italian regions to demonstrate the utility of the proposed measure. The analysis shows that corruption is greater in the southern Italian regions, as would be expected. Our proposed measure exhibits a strong statistically significant relationship inverse with Putnam's measure of government performance, suggesting that as corruption increases, government performance deteriorates. Finally, we show that high-level political malfeasance measured by the number of charges of malfeasance against members of Italy's Chamber of Deputies in the period from 1992 to 1994 is highly and significantly correlated with the more general measure of corruption that we propose.

Standard crossnational measures of corruption draw on information collected through surveys. We propose a novel alternative measure based on objective data, namely, the difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and a measure of the value of public capital stocks. Where the difference between the value of existing infrastructure and the actual physical infrastructure is larger, more money is being siphoned off in mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement; that is, corruption is greater. We create this measure for Italy's 20 regions as of the mid-1990s, controlling for possible regional differences in the costs of public construction. We analyze data over the Italian regions to demonstrate the utility of the proposed measure. The analysis shows that corruption is greater in the southern Italian regions, as would be expected. Our proposed measure exhibits a strong statistically significant relationship inverse with Putnam's measure of government performance, suggesting that as corruption increases, government performance deteriorates. Finally, we show that high-level political malfeasance measured by the number of charges of malfeasance against members of Italy's Chamber of Deputies in the period from 1992 to 1994 is highly and significantly correlated with the more general measure of corruption that we propose.

It is commonly believed that corporatist bargaining institutions have been in general decline in the 1980s and 1990s. The leading explanations of the purported universal trend toward greater decentralization of collective bargaining are the impact of technological change, changes in the occupational structure, and growing international economic integration. Decentralization should be particularly visible in the Nordic countries, because collective bargaining was more centralized in these countries in the 1960s and 1970s than in any others in Western Europe. In this article, the authors present data on the changes in the centralization of wage bargaining in the four Nordic countries since 1950. They document that a significant decentralization of collective bargaining has occurred in Sweden, as is well known, but not in the other three. The article concludes with a review of possible explanations of Swedish exceptionalism.