Suchergebnisse

Evaluates role of widespread anti-nuclear demonstrations in negotiation of the 1987 US-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Untersucht wird das Schwedische Modell der Sicherheitspolitik hinsichtlich seiner Grundannahmen und deren Konsistenz. Dieses Modell zeichnet sich durch zwei Dimensionen aus, nämlich die Neutralität und Nicht-Beteiligung an Allianzen zu Krisenzeiten kombiniert mit internationalistischen Ambitionen und einem aktiven Interesse an globaler Friedenspolitik. Die Untergliederung des Beitrages in die Untersuchung der Validität des Modells bearbeitet die theoretischen Annahmen der schwedischen Strategie und deren Realisierung. Der Abschnitt "Stabilität des Modells" analysiert, ob das Modell weiterhin als adäquat betrachtet werden kann, oder ob Veränderungen innerhalb der Weltpolitik diese Strategie mittlerweile obsolet erscheinen lassen. (AuD-Ber)

The object of the paper is to explicate two opposing intuitions: the belief that peace and security will benefit from international cooperation, and the belief that this is an illusion. The proposition that sustained cooperation inhibits war is taken to rest on two assumptions, one about images and the other about interests. An unfavorable image of the adversary is presumed to promote conflictive action, and cooperation is presumed to make contenders view each other more favorably. At the same time, cooperation is presumed to create values that would be endangered by war and hence to inhibit war by making it more costly. The first part of the paper is devoted to an elaboration of this view. Then, in the second part, several limitations of this theory about the way in which cooperation relates to conflict are identified, including its narrow scope, its limited testability, and its several theoretical weaknesses. The proposition is plausible only with regard to particular contenders and particular circumstances. There is reason to believe domestic-political factors to be important for the link between international cooperation and international conflict.

Goldmann, K. The Line in Water: International and Domestic Politics. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIV, 1989, 103-116. It is common to criticize political scientists for separating the inseparable and making a sharp distinction between international and domestic politics. The problem pre sumably is that different models of the fundamentals of politics are used by those concerned with international and domestic politics, that this separation reduces their ability to understand both, and that therefore the separate models ought to be merged with each other. The merger can take the form of establishing the linkages that may obtain between politics at the international and the domestic levels, or of presuming that the two levels are isomorphic and hence that international and domestic politics are not just interrelated but the same. In the paper, various merged models of politics are surveyed, and examples from Swedish politics are used to suggest a variety of new tasks for the comparative study of politics.

The discussion of international politics remains preoccupied with a construct called "realist theory". In this article it is first shown that there is confusion in the literature about the substantive contents of "realist theory" and that the thoughts ascribed to this theory tend to be ambiguous, inconsistent, or trivial. It is then argued that three fundamental concerns of international politics theory, which are commonly considered in terms of realism versus idealism, are easier to comprehend if we rid ourselves of this burden and discuss them in their own terms. The three theoretical issues are (1) the explanatory power of anarchy, (2) the immutability of international politics, and (3) the amorality of international politics.

Goldmann, K. Détente and Crisis. Cooperation and Conflict, XVIII, 1983, 215-232. Can a relationship of détente survive a crisis? This question is addressed as a problem of foreign policy stability. A framework of analysis is offered focusing on a number of factors in domestic politics, belief systems and international relations which may function as stabilizers of foreign policy, including détente policy, in times of crisis. It is emphasized that the protection of détente can be rendered difficult by the mechanism of negative interconnections. The slow pace of détente stabilization is another difficulty. Moreover, the stabilization of détente itself may be self-defeating by undermining the credibility of deterrence. The empirical illustration of these mechanisms has to do with Soviet-German relations during the Polish crisis. It is clear that a measure of détente survived the crisis. Even though it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of stress the Polish crisis created, it remains possible that even relatively limited stabilization of détente may have significant effects.

Can a relationship of détente survive a crisis? This question is addressed as a problem of foreign policy stability. A framework of analysis is offered focusing on a number of factors in domestic politics, belief systems and international relations which may function as stabilizers of foreign policy, including détente policy, in times of crisis. It is emphasized that the protection of détente can be rendered difficult by the mechanism of negative interconnections. The slow pace of détente stabilization is another difficulty. Moreover, the stabilization of détente itself may be self-defeating by undermining the credibility of deterrence. The empirical illustration of these mechanisms has to do with Soviet–German relations during the Polish crisis. It is clear that a measure of détente survived the crisis. Even though it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of stress the Polish crisis created, it remains possible that even relatively limited stabilization of détente may have significant effects.

What determines the occurrence, the scope, and the timing of major changes in foreign policy? In approaching this question, the author focuses on the "stabilizers" of foreign policy-that is, on the factors blocking, reducing the scope of, or delaying adaptation to new conditions, learning from negative feedback, or change in response to other disturbances. A framework for the analysis of stability in foreign policy is proposed. Several hypothetical stabilizers of foreign policies are discussed; they are grouped into administrative, political, cognitive, and international categories. Finally, the framework is applied to the problem of East-West detente.