Suchergebnisse

On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank's policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 - in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB's monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ's findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters - and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.

On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank's policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 – in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB's monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ's findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters – and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.

Abstract:This article argues that a distinction between the public and the private is both desirable and feasible in times of global governance, at least as a regulative idea. The confusion surrounding this distinction originates in different understandings of the relationship between state and society in liberalism and republicanism. Discourse theory with its idea of the co-origin of democracy and human rights reconceptualises the relationship between state and society in a way that does justice to both liberal and republican approaches. Accordingly, the public/private distinction is crucial for the realisation of democracy and freedom. Classifying an act as public or private determines what kind of legitimacy it requires. The article then recalibrates discourse theory to face the challenges of global governance, shifting its focus from hard law to a broader notion of authority, and from the state to a pluralistic, cosmopolitan world order composed of multiple overlapping communities. A community is characterised by communicative action and a common identity. In such a setting, public authority is the authority exercised on behalf of a community in relation to its members. In relation to non-members, the same act may constitute an exercise of private authority. It is a different question whether such authority is legitimate. Some examples illustrate the approach.

This article analyses the standard of review applied by the Court of Justice in the Gauweiler case concerning the European Central Bank's (ECB) Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) policy. It argues that the Court's focus on rationality and proportionality checks bears great potential for constitutional pluralism in the European Union. Both standards are relatively vague. This allows each actor to use these standards to keep other actors in check. Their particular virtue lies in the fact that they induce self-restraint in other actors because their vagueness leaves them in the dark about possible reactions and because all actors have an interest in keeping the Union intact, or at least in avoiding responsibility for causing serious cracks. Questions of hierarchy and the ultimate say can therefore remain undecided. The Federal Constitutional Court pursued exactly this strategy in its Solange judgments and the Honeywell decision. If it continues following this line of reasoning, the Gauweiler case would lead to a more robust form of constitutional pluralism in the EU. Under this framework, the ECB would have the possibility to decide, in the ambit of its discretionary powers, whether to participate in a sovereign debt restructuring.

Wallonien lässt die westliche Welt zappeln – und wird dafür je nach politischem Standpunkt des Betrachters als einzig aufrechtes gallisches Dorf besungen oder als eigennützige Erpresserbande geschmäht. Stutzig macht jedoch die prompte Reaktion, man hätte CETA besser doch nicht als "gemischtes Abkommen" einstufen sollen, sondern als Abkommen zwischen der EU und Kanada ohne direkte Beteiligung der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Reaktion zeugt von Demokratieverachtung.