Suchergebnisse

This article explores whether ASEANs approach toward Myanmar since May 2003 and the agreed ASEAN Security Community (ASC) concept can be seen to represent major developments in ASEANs diplomatic and security culture. The article explains that ASEANs recent diplomatic practice vis-à-vis Yangon qualifies as enhanced interaction. It also shows that the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II and related documents underscore the collective commitment among ASEAN states to pursue a limited refinement of ASEANs normative terrain. However, in view of the limits of enhanced interaction as well as the opposition to the original Indonesian proposal to develop an ASC the paper concludes that it is best to view both ASEANs recent diplomatic practice and efforts to stake out a larger role for ASEAN in preventing, managing and resolving intra-state conflicts and inter-state disputes as not only being in line with, but also as reaffirming the norms and practices of ASEANs diplomatic and security culture. (Contemp Southeast Asia/DÜI)

In the work of the late Professor Michael Leifer few concepts are invoked more often than the balance of power. It was due to his reliance on this concept that Michael Leifer came to be widely regarded as an exponent of realism and an advocate of countervailing balance of power practices. By reviewing Leifer's own writings, this article not only re-examines the now almost standard interpretation of his work, but also investigates the significance of the balance of power in his scholarship in new ways. The first section identifies the two key meanings Leifer explicitly imputed to the balance of power. It also examines Leifer's arguments relative to what he perceived as changes in the balance of power. This will be done with reference to his analyses of the international politics of Southeast and East Asia in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. The second section extends the discussion on the particularities of Leifer's writings on the balance of power, but relates it specifically to the question of what Leifer's writings suggest about his theoretical home. His ability to demonstrate the significance of the balance of power as a political factor in the foreign policies of individual Southeast Asian states is the focus of the third section. Finally, the article builds on Leifer's empirical writings on the importance of psychological factors in relation to the balance of power as policy to take up theoretically important questions that he himself did not pursue, particularly about the extent to which the balance of power is the product of struggles for security and recognition. The article draws three conclusions. First, Leifer should be thought of not as a diehard advocate of conventional balance of power practices, but rather as a scholar broadly working within English School parameters who was deeply wedded to the idea that the balance of power is necessary to uphold regional order in international society in the context of the rise of a potentially hegemonic power. Second, one of the finest aspects of Leifer's scholarly legacy is to be found in his discussion of the balance of power factor in the foreign policies of Southeast Asian states. Third, Leifer should also be an inspiration to those interested in empirical work underlining the importance of struggles for recognition in the formation and practice of the balance of power. (Pac Rev/DÜI)

The author explores the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the ASEAN as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for "flexible engagement" and the pursuit of "enhanced interaction" by some ASEAN members in the intramural relations. He attempts to understand the nature of and reasons for Thailand's formal challenge to the "ASEAN way" and examines to what extent Surin Pitsuwan's (Thai foreign minister's) advocacy of flexible engagement and ASEAN members' embrace of enhanced interaction have in fact eroded the ASEAN's long-standing principle for the conduct of international affairs. (DÜI-Sen)

Abstract: This article explores the extent to which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has succeeded in winning assent for its proposed principles and norms for interstate conduct, and recognition as an equal pole in an emerging regional order. The basic argument is that notwithstanding substantial evidence of ASEAN's central role in key regional institutions and parallels between the ASEAN experience and those of other multilateral regional organizations, one cannot assume the ASEANization of East Asia's regional order to be entrenched or irreversible. To demonstrate this, the article examines the challenges to the ASEANization of regional order in the security realm as posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. Beijing has largely responded positively to ASEAN's policy of engagement as regards confidence-building measures, but has been ambiguous about the extent to which it adheres to ASEAN's normative framework in the pursuit of Chinese policy objectives in the South China Sea. By contrast, Washington squarely challenges the ASEAN framework. Concerning ASEAN's struggle for recognition, neither China nor the United States appears prepared to accept ASEAN's centrality or even equality in other than formal terms in the future regional security architecture, since such status runs counter to the two powers' own identity claims and security interests.