Search results

Auf der Grundlage des Forschungs-Outputs (Publikationen) in den wichtigsten politikwissenschaftlichen Fachzeitschriften wird eine Rangskala der 100 führenden politikwissenschaftlichen Hochschulinstitute / Fachbereiche in Europa für den Zeitraum von 1998-2002 ermittelt. Unter methodischen Gesichtspunkten ist dabei allerdings ein Bias zugunsten englischsprachiger Veröffentlichungen festzustellen. (Hng / FUB)

Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institutions are used to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). The results of this model, tested on four hundred thousand individual MEP vote decisions, show that candidate-centered electoral systems (such as open-list proportional representation or singletransferable-vote systems) and decentralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians independent from their party principals. By contrast, party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation Systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians beholden to the parties that fight elections and choose candidates: in the case of the European Parliament, the national parties. (World Politics / SWP)

Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institutions are used to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). The results of this model, tested on four hundred thousand individual MEP vote decisions, show that candidate-centered electoral systems (such as open-list proportional representation or single-transferable-vote systems) and decentralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians independent from their party principals. By contrast, party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians beholden to the parties that fight elections and choose candidates: in the case of the European Parliament, the national parties.

It is a widely accepted that the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments did this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a 'constitutional agenda-setter'. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in the two main areas of EP power: in the legislative process (in the reform of the co-decision procedure), and in executive appointment (in the reform of the Commission investiture procedure). The article concludes that 'agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation' is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels.

It is a widely accepted that the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments did this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a 'constitutional agenda-setter'. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in the two main areas of EP power: in the legislative process (in the reform of the co-decision procedure), and in executive appointment (in the reform of the Commission investiture procedure). The article concludes that 'agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation' is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Since the 1990s, there has been considerable debate about the feasibility & desirability of establishing Euro-parties as a way to allow voters in European Union member states to express their opinions regarding EU policy. The idea is not new, dating back to the 1970s when three 'transnational party federations' were established in expectation of their necessity in an EC-level party political democracy: the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC, the Federation of Liberal & Democratic Parties of the EC, & the European People's Party, which federated the Christian Democratic parties. However, the federations never gained a sustainable level of power. The history of this effort is recounted, demonstrating the federations', & subsequently the parties', membership, organization, & systemic functionality. A mix of two models of party-based democracy is suggested to be the most viable political party system for the EU today: European domestic party systems & the American-style competitive system. Tables, References. J. Stanton