Suchergebnisse

Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation, self-regulation by the firm, and boycotts by the activists in a dynamic game. Our main results are the following. (i) The possibility to self-regulate saves on administrative costs, it therefore also leads to delays. (ii) The possibility to self-regulate benefits activists but harms the firm without the public regulator in place, the reverse is true with the regulator being present in the game. (iii) Without the public regulator, a boycott raises the likelihood of self-regulation, whereas if the regulator is present, it raises the likelihood of public regulation. (iv) Activism is a strategic complement to self-regulation, but a strategic substitute to public regulation. (v) In addition, the analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions regarding the regulatory outcomes and the duration of boycotts.

Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself.

When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development is sufficiently high. Bribery, however, is associated with holdup problems, which discourage firms from investing. If the holdup problems are severe, firms will never invest enough to make lobbying worthwhile. The country may then be stuck in a poverty trap with bribery forever. The model can account for the common perception that bribery is relatively more common in poor countries, whereas lobbying is relatively more common in rich ones.