Suchergebnisse

Focusing on Austria and five countries in Central Europe [the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (CEC-5)], the paper reviews selected economic developments related to the enlargement of the European Union. Over the past decade, Austria has enjoyed disproportionate gains from the liberalization of trade and capital flows with the CECs. EU enlargement will merely consolidate those gains, not increase them. Apace with the recent global economic downturn, the climate conducive to enlargement has also worsened - just at a time when the accession negotiations were finally coming to a head. Average economic growth in the CECs will be of the order of 3% in both 2002 and 2003; sluggish growth is forecast for Poland alone. After experiencing a setback to its economic recovery, Austria estimates that its GDP growth rate next year will be 2%. Unemployment will also increase, albeit only slightly and still far below CEC levels. In the medium and long term the candidate countries in Central Europe stand to benefit greatly from entering the EU, although the more immediate costs associated with the adoption of the acquis communautaire will impose an appreciable burden at the outset. None the less, it is quite conceivable that some of the new member states may even become net contributors to the EU budget in the initial post-accession period. On closer study, the outcome of full participation in the European Single Market could well be that EU enlargement is a win-win game. In terms of GDP growth, the CECs on average may well outstrip their EU counterparts by a factor of ten. Of the present EU member states, Austria has gained most from enlargement and will probably continue to do so. Delaying enlargement would be both costly and politically damaging for Europe as a whole. The marked impact of enlargement on growth will induce income convergence in the CECs, thereby reducing potential migration. Given the similar demographic trends in both the present EU member states and the candidate countries in Central Europe, migration and the associated labour shortages may also become an issue of major concern to the CECs. The overall impact on the EU labour market should, however, be limited. Political considerations will play a crucial role in this segment of the accession negotiations. Austria is one of the CECs' main trading partners. Trade with the CECs has a pronounced positive impact on both Austrian output and employment. By the end of 2001, the FDI inflow into the CEC-5 amounted to nearly USD 100 billion, of which some USD 7.7 billion (8%) came from Austria, thus facilitating further economic expansion on the part of Austrian companies. The additional trade effects of EU enlargement will doubtless remain within certain limits. FDI-related trade will display a certain measure of growth and increases are to be expected in trade in the service sector. The close economic ties show that to all intents and purposes the current political disputes between Austria and certain CECs would seem to have no impact on decision-making processes at the company level. In sum, economic data confirm the growing importance of regional integration in Central Europe and the benefits it yields for all countries concerned.

The year 2000 was exceptionally good for the transition countries. The region as a whole expanded faster than the world economy average. However, the favourable external climate has started to deteriorate rapidly and especially the current pronounced weakening of the EU economy is worrying. The transition economies, especially those which aspire for EU membership, may be seriously affected. And it would perhaps not be their economic growth that would suffer the most, but the climate for enlargement in the EU, and this just at the time when accession negotiations are entering their final and most difficult phase. As of mid-2001, there are hardly any signs that the current global economic slowdown will immediately affect the transition countries' short-term growth prospects. Domestic demand is robust, though the growth of industrial production somewhat decelerated during the first months of the year. If there is a noticeable growth slowdown, as in Poland, Russia and Macedonia, then domestic factors are largely to blame. A few countries which have attracted large amounts of outward-oriented FDI and improved their competitive position have so far not been impacted adversely by the recent EU growth weakening. Moreover, many transition countries also report expanding domestic demand, which is thus taking over the growth stimulus from declining net exports. In several countries external balances are deteriorating. Russia continues to enjoy high revenues from energy exports, the GDP growth is clearly slowing down. The economies of the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe will grow by about 3.5% on average in both 2001 and 2002 - only marginally less than during 2000. A more pronounced deceleration of GDP growth is forecast only for Poland and Russia, in both cases largely for domestic economic policy reasons. Inflation will slowly recede to single-digit annual rates (Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia and Ukraine are exceptions), but will remain higher than in the EU (except possibly in the Czech Republic) - just as will unemployment. Current account deficits, though generally quite high and growing, are of no immediate concern yet, but should be watched closely.

This overview paper deals with selected economic aspects of EU enlargement related to Austria and the five Central European countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (CEC-5). Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Austria has been enjoying over-proportionate gains from liberalized trade and capital flows. EU enlargement will cement and further increase these gains. However, the current weakening of the EU economy could adversely affect the climate for enlargement just at a time when accession negotiations are entering their most difficult phase. The CEC economies will grow by about 3 to 4% on average in both 2001 and 2002, a marked deceleration of growth is forecast only for Poland. Most CECs suffer from high and growing unemployment. In Austria, economic growth is set to decelerate to 1.3% in 2001 and may pick up slightly next year while unemployment will remain low. CEC candidates' benefits from EU accession will be large in the short and medium run, though their costs associated with the takeover of aquis communautaire will also be considerable. Estimates of the implications from the full participation in the European Single Market show that EU enlargement is a win-win situation. The CECs will on average gain around ten times more than the EU. Hungary and Poland may increase their real GDP by an additional 8 to 9% over a ten-year period (including the pre-accession period 2001 to 2004), the Czech Republic gains somewhat less (4 to 6%), just as Slovakia and Slovenia. Austria is probably the biggest enlargement winner among the EU member states; it could additionally gain some 0.7% of GDP. The stronger growth impact of enlargement in the CECs spurs their income convergence and thus reduces the migration potential. The overall impact on the EU labour market should be limited. For Austria, the number of residents from CECs is estimated to increase from around 1.3 % of the Austrian population to 5.5% in 2030. Due to similar demographic trends in both the present EU and the CEC candidates, migration/labour shortages may become a major source of concern in CECs as well. Blocking inward migration while outward migration continues could negatively affect both economic growth and the stability of social security systems. Political considerations play a crucial role in this segment of accession negotiations. Austria is among the leading trading partners of the CECs. Exports to this region amounted to nearly EUR 8.5 billion in 2000, the Austrian trade balance with the CECs has traditionally been in surplus. Trade with CECs has a clearly positive impact on both Austrian output and employment. By the end of 2000, nearly USD 80 billion of FDI entered the CEC-5, of which about USD 6 billion (7% of the total) came from Austria, creating favourable conditions for further economic expansion. Additional trade effects of EU enlargement are bound to be limited. FDI-related trade exchanges will grow and one may expect increases in services trade. Intense economic co-operation shows that the current political disputes between Austria and some CECs apparently do not affect decision-making processes at company level. In sum, economic data confirm the growing importance of regional integration in Central Europe and its benefits for all countries concerned.

Both the current economic situation and the short-term growth outlook of virtually all countries in transition are better than at any time during the last decade. Driven by higher import demand from the EU, the Central and East European countries are enjoying an export boom which fuels their GDP growth. Russia has been profiting from rising world market commodity prices while its industry is still cashing on the import substitution effects after devaluation. Industry has been the main contributor to the economic recovery of the region whereas agriculture suffers from a severe drought. A strong growth of industrial production, coupled with further lay-offs of redundant workers, translates into impressive improvements in the labour productivity. The cost advantages of successful CEE producers are rapidly improving. With further progress in transition these cost advantages will certainly contribute to more re-allocation of production to this region. The less pleasant consequence of the rising efficiency has been rising unemployment. Double-digit unemployment rates have now become a rule. Apart from the truly disastrous labour market situation in several countries of former Yugoslavia, unemployment has recently acquired dramatic dimensions especially in Bulgaria and in the Slovak Republic. Moreover, nowhere in the region is there hope for a marked improvement. And even more than in the rest of Europe, the CEECs' unemployment patterns display distinct regional, gender, age and minority differences which have serious implications for economic and social policies. Foreign trade has once again become an engine of CEECs' economic growth; exports were growing by 30% in current euro terms during the first quarter of 2000. The development of imports was nearly equally dynamic (+28%), and the CEECs' trade deficit further increased - mostly on account of a further deterioration of the trade balance in Poland. Rapidly growing trade with the EU has been the main cause for the recent dynamic developments whereby CEECs' terms of trade deteriorated. The recent expansion of CEECs' exports occurred despite a noticeable appreciation of their currencies. FDI inflows have increased substantially in several CEECs who not long ago had been either sceptical to foreign ownership (especially Poland and the Czech Republic) or unattractive (Bulgaria and Romania). Economic growth is expected to gain momentum in all transition countries covered by this report during the next two years. While inflation will slightly increase in 2000, it will remain moderate and will come down next year. Current account deficits are likely to expand, but no immediate dangers (with the possible exception of Poland) are on the horizon in the forecasting period. A major concern is the stubbornly high and rising unemployment which has to be addressed appropriately.

Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der mittel- und osteuropäischen Reformstaaten gegen Mitte der neunziger Jahre zu beurteilen. Hierzu legt der Verfasser eine vergleichende Analyse des Lohnniveaus, der Arbeitsproduktivität und der Lohnstückkosten insgesamt sowie für das produzierende Gewerbe und einzelne Branchen aufgeschlüsselt vor. Die Untersuchung zeigt, daß die Lohnstückkosten im Durchschnitt bei unter 50% des westeuropäischen Niveaus liegen. Zusammen mit der geographischen Nähe der mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten zu den westlichen Märkten und der guten Qualifikation der Arbeitskräfte ergibt sich hieraus ein wichtiger Wettbewerbsvorteil für die Staaten der Region, zunächst vor allem für arbeitsintensive Branchen, perspektivisch jedoch auch für die Volkswirtschaften insgesamt. (BIOst-Wpt)

AbstractBy mid‐1996, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies have brought lower inflation and exchange rate stability to Russia. The mass privatization was an apparent success although it contributed to an unclear ownership structure and weak corporate governance. The production decline continues and the structure of the Russian economy has been deteriorating. The popular dissatisfaction with the drop in living standards is reflected by a deep split in society, despite Mr. Yeltsin's victory in the presidential elections. As in the recent past, the new government will continue with 'stop‐and‐go' reform policies, probably with a stronger accent on the protection of domestic producers, legal reforms and economic growth. Because of serious structural and institutional distortions, the Russian economy is more likely to stagnate than to grow strongly in the near future.

The recent financial and political crises in the world sent severe shocks through emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Although these crises are regrettable events that caused so much suffering to so many people, we must embrace the opportunity to scrutinize this defining moment in the history of the world economy to learn from it and discover many valuable facts that are of great significance to contemporary economics and the international community. This volume, which explores the economic impact of the crises on emerging markets in the CEE and FSU regions, provides valuable findings that are unique in that they shed new light upon many of the aspects that previous studies have failed to adequately address. The present compendium of papers distinguishes itself from the previous literature in that it also explores how the Russian economy was affected by economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and other nations after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Georgia has long been one of the most trade-open economies in the world. It joined WTO in 2000 and currently has a free trade agreement with the EU and EFTA, as well as with Turkey, the CIS and China. Georgia has been also one of the most business-friendly countries. The basic objectives of Georgia's trade policy are integration, liberalisation, diversification and transparency. The Association Agreement (AA) with the EU signed in June 2014 and in force since July 2016 lays the foundations for far-reaching political and economic cooperation with the EU and serves as a backbone for reforms. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement that represents a part of AA envisages a gradual implementation of reforms in areas such as trade, environment, agriculture, tourism, energy, transport and education with the aim to bring Georgia in line with EU standards. The DCFTA sets a path for further reforms in trade-related policies, such as hygiene standards for agriculture products, the approximation of regulations for industrial products, enforcement of intellectual property rights at the border, rules on public procurement and approximation to EU rules in the services area. However, there is no prospect for EU membership in the Agreement. Georgia has been suffering from chronic goods trade and current account deficits; the export base has been very narrow. Foreign trade has been regionally focused on its neighbouring partners. Russia is the largest export market, ahead of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and China. Among the EU countries, the biggest markets for Georgian exports are Bulgaria and Romania. Exports are highly concentrated and there has not been much export diversification yet. The key exports to the EU include copper ores (39% of the total), nuts, nitrogen fertilisers and mineral oils. The DCFTA apparently has not had much positive effect on Georgian exports to the EU so far, despite some spectacular increases by individual products. Rather than in goods exports, Georgia has a competitive advantage in services, especially in tourism and transit transport. Georgia has been also relatively successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) cumulated inward FDI stocks amounted to about EUR 4,000 per capita as of mid-2018. A development strategy combining existing competitive advantages of tourism with domestic agriculture (using the excellent domestic wine and delicious local food), supported by structural reforms in the agricultural sector and targeted FDI policies, could be a viable option to foster inclusive economic growth and mitigate external vulnerabilities.

The imbalance between the costs and benefits of DCFTAs is a call to the EU to display greater thoughtfulness and pragmatism if it does not want to lose support for reforms in its neighbourhood. What has to happen so that their potential can be more beneficial? The Policy Brief written by Amat Adarov and Peter Havlik in cooperation with Bertelsmann Stiftung discusses the policy implications of the agreements.

This paper analyses the speed and patterns of economic convergence in the new EU Member States of Central and Eastern Europe during transition and the first years of EU membership. After a brief discussion of measurement and data issues, the paper provides stylised facts on growth and convergence in Europe, and explores various convergence measures proposed in the growth literature. It employs several analytical approaches in order to reveal convergence speed and patterns univariate growth regressions, multivariate econometric analysis, including the testing of convergence models and running different growth regressions. The aim is to look at various aspects of convergence processes by using alternate approaches and then, by putting those together, to seek common and distinct features. We confirm that the one-off direct negative effects of the crisis on GDP growth were considerably stronger in the case of NMS. The growth patterns were interrupted and the convergence process slowed down. The paper underlines the significant, sometimes even increasing, heterogeneity of growth, pointing more generally to uneven economic convergence within the EU. This concerns not only the lasting differences between the NMS and the rest of the EU, but also significant dissimilarities between the growth patterns among individual countries within each of these subgroups.

In the wake of the 'Arab Spring' several observers compared the changes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the transition of the former communist countries in Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE) to parliamentary democracy and market economy starting two decades ago. Relying on the wiiw's long standing experience in analysing both the centrally planned economic systems and the institutional and economic aspects of transition, the following Policy Note attempts – without claiming to have a detailed knowledge regarding MENA countries at the moment - to find possible common features, similarities and/or differences between the economic situation of the MENA countries and the challenges facing the former centrally planned economies during the past two decades. The aim of this note is to contribute to discussion regarding the elaboration of a strategy assisting MENA's economic transition.