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▪ Abstract  Growing interdependence between jurisdictions means that states are increasingly using private actors as proxies in order to achieve desired regulatory outcomes. International relations theory has had difficulty in understanding the exact circumstances under which they might wish to do this. Drawing on literatures in both international relations and legal scholarship, this article proposes a framework for understanding when states will or will not use private actors as proxy regulators. This framework highlights the relationship between state preferences and the presence or absence of a "point of control," a special kind of private actor. The article then conducts an initial plausibility probe of the framework, assessing how well it explains outcomes in the regulation of gambling, privacy, and the taxation of e-commerce.

Growing interdependence between jurisdictions means that states are increasingly using private actors as proxies in order to achieve desired regulatory outcomes. International relations theory has had difficulty in understanding the exact circumstances under which they might wish to do this. Drawing on literatures in both international relations & legal scholarship, this article proposes a framework for understanding when states will or will not use private actors as proxy regulators. This framework highlights the relationship between state preferences & the presence or absence of a "point of control," a special kind of private actor. The article then conducts an initial plausibility probe of the framework, assessing how well it explains outcomes in the regulation of gambling, privacy, & the taxation of e-commerce. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Cooperation between small firms in "industrial districts," where the production process may be radically dis-integrated, poses an important challenge to current political science theories of trust and cooperation. In this article, the author suggests that the problems posed by these districts—the existence of apparently irrational forms of trust in the political economy and of high-trust forms of cooperation in societies with low levels of interpersonal trust—may be explained if one adopts a more sophisticated institutional approach. The author shows how institutions may affect trust between economic actors and thus cooperation in two case studies of industrial districts, mechanical engineering in Bologna, Italy, and Stuttgart, Germany, and shows that empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that trust may depend on institutions and vary with institutional context.

Die Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen ist in letzter Zeit häufig davon ausgegangen, dass Staaten ausserstande sind, e-commerce zu kontrollieren, so dass private Akteure eine dominante Rolle spielen würden. Dieser Literaturstrang vernachlässigt jedoch sog. "hybride Institutionen", in denen Staaten allgemeine Regeln schaffen, die dann von privaten Akteuren umgesetzt werden. Dieser Artikel untersucht ein bedeutendes Beispiel für diese Art von Institutionen, das EU-US Safe Harbor Abkommen im Bereich der Privatsphäre, und entwickelt verschiedenen Erklärungsansätze fürdie Beziehungen zwischen staatlichen und privaten Akteuren im e-commerce. Er zeigt, dass Safe Harbor aus Bemühungen der EU und der USA entstanden ist, Probleme der Interdependenz zu verringern, welche die Grundprinzipien der Regulierungssysteme bedrohten. Safe Harbor entspricht weder ausschliesslich dem Ansatz der EU noch dem Ansatz der USA, sondern ist eher eine neuartige Mischung aus privater und staatlicher Regulierung. Der Artikel demonstriert die zentrale Rolle von Argumenten und Überredung bei der Identifikation von Safe Harbor als Lösung sowie bei der Verhandlung der Details. Es zeigt sich, dass konventionelle spieltheoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von Safe Harbor scheitern. Deshalb sollten konstruktivistische Ansätzen darauf richten, inwieweit Argumente neue Handlungsmöglichkeiten eröffnen. (SWP-Jns)

Much recent international relations scholarship has argued that states are unable to control e-commerce, so that private actors are coming to play a dominant role. However, this body of literature fails to account for emerging "hybrid institutions," in which states create general frameworks of rules, which are then implemented by private actors. This article examines a prominent example of such an institution, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor arrangement in the field of privacy, and sets out an alternative explanation of state–private actor relations in the sphere of e-commerce. It shows how Safe Harbor had its origins in efforts by the European Union (EU) and United States to mitigate problems of interdependence that threatened to undermine the principles of order on which their regulatory systems were based. Safe Harbor reflects neither the EU nor U.S. approach, but rather a novel blend of state and private regulation. The article demonstrates the vital role of argument and persuasion in identifying Safe Harbor as a solution, and in negotiating its particulars. It finds that conventional game-theoretic accounts of bargaining are unable to explain the negotiation of Safe Harbor, and argues that constructivist approaches should pay more attention to how argument can disclose new possibilities of action.